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God fashioned the ship of the world carefully
With the infinite skill of an all-master ....
Then-at fateful time-a wrong called,
And God turned, heeding.
Lo, the ship, at this opportunity, slipped slyly,
Making cunning noiseless travel down the ways.
So that, forever rudderless, it went upon the seas
Going ridiculous voyages,
Making quaint progress,
Turning as with serious purpose
Before stupid winds.
Stephen Crane1
* UTK and Walter Bussart Distinguished Professor, University of Tennessee College
of Law. J.D., University of Pennsylvania. Research for this Article was supported by a
generous summer research grant from the College.
1. Stephen Crane, The Black Riders, V, in WAR IS KIND AND OTHER POEMS (Julie Nord
ed., 1998).
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INTRODUCTION
In ancient and early English legal lore, continuing into the
twelfth century,2 a serious criminal could be decreed Wolveseved,3
or outlaw. He was thus cast, according to its medieval incantation,
as caput lupinum4 or figuratively bearing the head of the wolf.5
Then, according to Blackstone, he "might be knocked on the head
like a wolf, by any one that should meet him."6 Other commentators
were more vivid in their description, saying "[iut is the right and
duty of every man to pursue him, to ravage his land ... [and] hunt
him down like a wild beast and slay him; for a wild beast he is; not
merely is he a 'friendless man,' he is a wolf."7
The rationale for the harsh Wolveseved decree for a transgressor
was that "having renounced all law, he was to be dealt with as in a
state of nature, when every one that should find him might slay
him."' Some scholars even purport to find this type of process
2. Trisha Olson, Of Enchantment: The Passing of the Ordeals and the Rise of the Jury
Trial, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 109, 139 (2000).
3. 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 449 & n.1 (2d ed. 1898).
4. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 315 (Cambridge
Univ. Press 1979) (1769).
5. Id.; Arthur Allen Leff, The LeffDictionary of Law: A Fragment, 94 YALE L.J. 1855,
2249 (1985); see also Bruce MacDougall, Ex Turpi Causa: Should a Defence Arise from a Base
Cause?, 55 SASK. L. REV. 1, 4 & n.16 (1991) (defining "caput lupinum" as meaning outlaw or
wolfs head); Robert A. Prentice, Of Tort Reform and Millionaire Muggers: Should an Obscure
Equitable Doctrine be Revived to Dent the Litigation Crisis?, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 53, 63 &
n.55 (1995) (referring to the phrase as meaning a "wolfs head" or outlaw). The term, and
equivalent capus lupus and caput genere lupinum phrases, literally mean the "wolfs head,"
and refer to a person who has been outlawed. Leff, supra, at 2249; see also Drew v. Drew, 37
Me. 389, 391 (1854) (construing the term outlaw for the purposes of language in a contract,
and discussing various meanings of the term outlaw, one of which meant"one who is put out
of the law" and was said to be "caput genere lupinum"); ALAN HARDING, A SOCIAL HISTORY
OFENGLISHLAW 19 (1966) (referring to gerit caput lupinum as "he bears the head of a wolf').
6. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 4, at 315.
7. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 3, at 449.
8. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 4, at 315. Professor Olson writes:
The medieval knowledge of wrongdoing then was more than the infliction of
harm upon another. Wrong's darkness inhered in its quality of a breaking of
faith, fidelitas. The outlaw... not only declared war upon his community, but
also upon himself. By his deed, he broke those bonds that granted him identity.
Olson, supra note 2, at 139. With identity fractured, then, it became easier to characterize
the criminal as lupinum, the wolf. See id.
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underlying some biblical events.9 The decree of caput lupinum and
outlawry was not, however, an expression of a strong legal system.
Quite the contrary, such ready recourse to the outlawry mantle was
a manifestation of a weak system of laws,' and the lack of refined
humane legal structures with which to tailor punishments. It has
been noted that "recourse to outlawry is... one of the tests by which
the relative barbarousness of various bodies of ancient law may be
measured."" But, "[giraduallylaw learns how to inflict punishment
with a discriminating hand."2 Eventually, outlawry lost its
"exterminating character"' and was, in that extreme form at least,
abandoned "to avoid such inhumanity."1
4
Although the extreme notion of caput lupinum has largely lost
its legal standing as a general principle, especially in the United
States, an artifact remains. An increasing number of courts
have, to varying degrees, recognized a special doctrine barring
unintentional 5 tort claims arising out of a plaintiffs serious
(usually criminal) wrongdoing. This cabalistic and aperiodic
9. See 3 MAT'HEW HENRY, A COMIENTARY ON THE OLD AND NEW TESTAMENTS 194
(1904) (interpreting Psalm 58 and referring to the proclamation of "qui caput gerit
lupinum-an outlawed wolf," whom "any man might kill and no man might protect").
10. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 3, at 449.
11. Id. at 450.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 449.
14. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 4, at 315; see also 2 POLLOCK& MAITLAND, supra note 3,
at 459. The current state of outlawry under English law is beyond the scope of this Article
and is not addressed. For background on American law, see infra note 28.
15. This Article will focus exclusively on United States cases, and primarily on the
serious misconduct doctrine in the context of claims for unintentional injuries. The standing
and nature of the serious misconduct bar when the defendant is alleged to have committed
an intentional tort is not clear and may sometimes be entwined with the analysis of various
common law and statutory privileges to protect persons or property. DANB. DOBBS, THE LAW
OF TORTS § 78, at 179-80 (2000) (stating that "[ilt does not seem likely that courts would
apply any such forfeiture principle so as to permit the possessor [of land] to shoot the
felonious intruder intentionally and needlessly"). Suffice it to say that my recommendation
in this Article that the serious misconduct doctrine be abandoned as a separate independent
defense or bar would logically encompass both intentional as well as unintentional torts.
Various privileges designed to protect persons or property may sometimes shield a
defendant from intentional tort claims by persons injured while engaged in serious
misconduct. Id. §§ 68-81. Liability may also sometimes be affected by issues related to the
validity and scope of the plaintiffs consent. Id. § 105; see also infra note 202. But, then to
that extent, the outcome of such claims would depend on those privileges or on the consent
issues, which would operate independently and irrespective of the separate serious
misconduct doctrine.
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doctrine, which I will refer to as the serious misconduct bar, had for
years largely operated below the radar screen of much of the legal
community. During the era when traditional contributory
negligence and its implied assumption of risk cousin constituted
complete bars to tort recovery, 6 the serious misconduct bar was to
a great extent subsumed into those more mainstream outcome-
determinative defenses.' 7 Following the emergence of comparative
fault in most jurisdictions, 8 however, contributory negligence no
longer necessarily constituted an automatic complete bar to a
plaintiffs recovery. 9 Once the complete bar husk of traditional
contributory negligence was peeled away by the ascendancy of
comparative fault, the question of the previously submerged serious
misconduct rule remained. This atavistic doctrine survives today,
existing as a torts quintessence apart from the traditional elements
and defenses of tort law. It operates as a freestanding construct,
lurking in the crawl space beneath both the traditional torts
elements and the defenses based on plaintiffs fault, such as
contributory and comparative negligence.2"
16. See, e.g., Paul T. Hayden, Butterfield Rides Again: Plaintiffs Negligence as
Superseding or Sole Proximate Cause in Systems of Pure Comparative Responsibility, 33 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 887, 887-90 (2000) (discussing history of the complete bar rule of traditional
contributory negligence).
17. Thus, one court noted (in a jurisdiction that had replaced contributory negligence
with a comparative fault rule) that "in those cases in which recovery is barred on public
policy grounds [under the serious misconduct bar], the result mirrors the outcome of the
abandoned contributory negligence rule." Ardinger v. Hummell, 982 P.2d 727, 736 (Alaska
1999).
18. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTS: APPORTIONMENTOFLIABILITY § 7 cmt. a, reporter's
note (2000) (noting that there has been an "avalanche" of jurisdictions that have adopted
comparative fault, and that only a few jurisdictions continue to use contributory negligence).
19. DOBBS, supra note 15, at 503. The fall of the complete bar rule has been especially
dramatic in jurisdictions adopting a so-called "pure" version of comparative fault in which
the plaintiffs recovery is reduced but not barred even if the plaintiffs fault exceeds the level
of fault of the defendant. Id. at 505. Where a jurisdiction has adopted some version of a
"modified" system, the plaintiffs fault may still operate to completely bar his tort claim if his
level of fault crosses the threshold level specified in the version of comparative fault that is
applicable. Id. Even in the modified states, however, the likelihood of a complete bar may
often be reduced by the fact that relative fault of the parties will usually be up to the jury to
decide, and by the rule in most modified states that compares the plaintiffs fault with the
aggregate fault of all other contributing tortfeasors. Id. at 531. Most states have also
subsumed implied assumption of risk into their comparative negligence scheme. Id. at 539;
see infra note 204.
20. See Barkerv. Kallash, 468 N.E.2d 39,43-44 (N.Y. 1984) (noting that the doctrine "has
1016
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We are beginning to see signs of renewed interest in the serious
misconduct bar as a way for defendants to definitively short-circuit
a lawsuit and thus avoid the partial damages awards under
comparative fault regimes. Moreover, despite pronouncements of its
demise,2 1 the serious misconduct doctrine has shown signs of
reemergence in a wide spectrum of personal injury cases and legal
malpractice claims arising out of defense of criminal prosecutions.22
Because the serious misconduct bar was, for much of its desultory
history, largely subsumed into the contributory negligence
defense,' it is difficult to reliably gauge its current standing. It has
been a torpid doctrine, like a subacute but chronic infection, only
partially and temporarily suppressed. It lies dormant for a while at
one location, only to rear its head somewhere else.
To further cloud the subject, the courts have not clearly identified
or articulated a convincing rationale for the serious misconduct bar.
The most common explanation for the doctrine is that the law will
not allow a wrongdoer whose injury arises out of his serious
misconduct to "benefit" from his wrongdoing by recovering damages
from a tortfeasor who otherwise might be liable for causally
contributing to the injury.24 As will be discussed, I believe that
these and other ostensible justifications for the doctrine are
specious. More centrally, I think the serious misconduct bar is
objectionable on more fundamental grounds. First, the doctrine
frustrates the policy goals of tort law. Second, it is instrumentally
flawed because it moves decision makers out of the established
elemental and comparative fault torts framework into an ad hoc
and potentially selective process. Third, the serious misconduct bar
suffers structurally from the absence of lucid, predictable, or
workable standards guiding its application. Finally, the doctrine is
always existed independently from the rule of contributory negligence and its successor,
comparative negligence"). The serious misconduct doctrine, focusing exclusively on the
plaintiff's conduct, is also different from various common law and statutory rules that may
limit the duty or liability of owners and occupiers of land to entrants injured while
committing specified misconduct. These latter rules depend not only on the plaintiff's status
and conduct, but on the interests of defendants as owners and occupiers. See DOBBS, supra
note 15, §§ 209, 231-232, 236-237.
21. Prentice, supra note 5, at 82.
22. See infra notes 48-100 and accompanying text.
23. DOBBS, supra note 15, at 525.
24. See infra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
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operationally dangerous because it requires the court to evaluate
the plaintiff's conduct through a moral prism trained on an ever-
changing social landscape and climate, resulting in the potential for
selective and arbitrary application.
The danger of this doctrine lies in its reductive simplicity. It
contemplates the kind of ad hoc moral judgments that are
inherently subjective. They are also selective, in the sense that we
usually2 5 do not otherwise inquire into the moral fiber of the
plaintiff. The medieval flavor and purple lingo of the serious
misconduct doctrine may help explain its slippery survival.
Remember Camus's admonition, that when "tricks of language
contribute to maintaining an abuse that must be reformed or a
suffering that can be relieved, then there is no other solution but to
speak out and show the obscenity hidden under the verbal cloak.""
The serious misconduct doctrine operates not to produce
predictability and certainty, but perversely to inject chaos into the
process and provide fertile ground for exploitation and abuse.
In the sections that follow I will briefly examine the problematic
underpinnings of the serious misconduct bar. My purpose here is
not to comprehensively survey the national case law or that of any
particular state. Next, I will evaluate some of the manifold
arguments that have been advanced in support of the doctrine. I
will then explain my thesis that the serious misconduct doctrine
should be eliminated as a freestanding bar to liability in tort claims.
I. CURRENT INCARNATION
A. Vague Vestiges
At one time serious criminals were deemed outlaws, figuratively
bearing, according to the medieval incantation, "caput lupinum" or
the wolf's head.2 But, over the years, the law and judicial attitudes
25. There are, however, other exceptions such as cases that have rejected defamation
claims because the plaintiff was found to be "libel-proof." Joseph H. King, Jr., The
Misbegotten Libel-Proof Plaintiff Doctrine and the 'Gordian Knot" Syndrome, 29 HOFSTRA
L. REv. 343, 344 (2000).
26. Albert Camus, Reflections on the Guillotine, in RESISTANCE, REBELUON, AND DEATH
131, 133 (Justin O'Brien trans., Random House 1960).
27. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
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changed, at least in the United States, so that in general persons
who have committed crimes do not ipso facto lose the protection of
the rule of law for all purposes.28 Yet, for the purposes of tort claims
arising out of the plaintiff's commission of a serious crime or
misconduct, a growing number of cases deem the plaintiff an outlaw
of sorts.29 According to the doctrine, sometimes a person who
violates criminal laws (or perhaps otherwise engages in especially
serious misconduct) is "treated as something of an outlaw who...
is disentitled to seek redress through the courts for any injury to
which his criminal conduct contributed." °
Most commentators trace the obscure origins of the serious
misconduct bar to contract law."1 Traditionally, a contract might be
deemed unenforceable "if either its formation or its performance is
criminal, tortious, or otherwise opposed to public policy." 2 Perhaps
to lend the doctrine an air of respectability and intellectual
standing, the doctrine is often characterized as an emanation of the
Latin contract maxim ex turpi causa non oritur,3 which, as
expansively interpreted to reach tort, would mean essentially, "that
no lawsuit may be brought by a person who has committed an
28. This is true even for prisoners in most states. See generally 2 MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN,
RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 15.1 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing the nearly universal demise of the so-
called "civil death laws" for prisoners in the United States, and noting that "civil death laws
in modem practice, impose no significant disability on inmates").
29. MacDougall, supra note 5, at 2 (stating that the doctrine 'renders the plaintiff an
outlaw for the purposes of the case before the court").
30. 3 FOWLERV. HARPERETAL., THE LAW OFTORTS § 17.6, at 617 (2d ed. 1986).
31. See Frances H. Bohlen, Consent asAffecting Civil Liability for Breaches of the Peace,
24 COLU. L. REv. 819, 819-21 (1924); MacDougall, supra note 5, at 2; Prentice, supra note
5, at 57-62.
32. 2 RESTATEMENTOFCONTRACTS § 512 (1932); see id. § 598 (statingthat such contracts
are unenforceable, subject to exceptions). The current status of modem contract law is
beyond the scope of this Article. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178
& cmt. b (1979) (adopting an approach based on a "balancing, in light of all the
circumstances, of the interest in the enforcement of the particularpromise against the policy
against the enforcement," and noting that "in some cases the contravention of public policy
is so grave, as when an agreement involves a serious crime or tort, that unenforceability is
plain"); E. ALLANFARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 5.1, at 324 (3d ed. 1999) (noting that unless the
agreement involves commission of a serious crime or tort or the promise itself offends public
policy, "the court's decision must rest on a delicate balancing of factors").
33. See Bohlen, supra note 31, at 819-20; MacDougall, supra note 5, at 2. The Latin
phrase ex turpi causa is typically translated to mean: "No cause of action can arise out of an
immoral (or illegal) inducement (or consideration)." BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 447 (3d
ed. 1969); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 607 (7th ed. 1999).
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illegal or immoral act." 4 In fact, the serious misconduct doctrine is
occasionally and variously referred to not only as the "outlaw"
doctrine, 5 but also as the "ex turpi"6 rule.
For decades the serious misconduct doctrine largely lay dormant
in tort law with few cases explicitly addressing it. This was
probably a function of the fact that contributory negligence operated
in binary fashion, either completely barring plaintiffs claim, or not
at all. 7 The serious misconduct doctrine had essentially the same
effect as contributory negligence, and was thus largely subsumed
into the broader contributory negligence defense.3" With the
widespread adoption of comparative fault, one might have expected
the doctrine, shorn of the cover of the complete bar rule of
contributory negligence, to have withered and died. Indeed, at least
one commentator has pronounced that the doctrine has "virtually
disappeared" in the United States in recent years .39 That conclusion
is belied by reality and represents wishful thinking.4 0 The doctrine
commands increasing support in the courts,41 and even some
commentators seem not quite able to let go of it.42 Although not
34. Prentice, supra note 5, at 55.
35. Flanagan v. Baker, 621 N.E.2d 1190, 1192 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993) (referring to a
variation of the serious misconduct bar as the "outlaw" doctrine); DOBBS, supra note 15, at
526; 3 HARPERETAL., supra note 30, at 633 (referring to the doctrine as the "outlaw theory");
Harold S. Davis, The Plaintiffs Illegal Act as a Defense in Actions of Tort, 18 HARV. L. REV.
505, 518 (1905); MacDougall, supra note 5, at 2 (saying that the rule "renders the plaintiff
an outlaw for the purposes of the case before the court"). The serious misconduct bar has also
gone under other aliases, such as the "wrongful-conductrule." Rosenickv. Chan, No. 214298,
2001 WL 776737, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2001).
36. MacDougall, supra note 5, at 1; Prentice, supra note 5, at 55-56.
37. DOBBS, supra note 15, at 525 (claiming that the serious misconduct bar did not
matter before adoption of comparative fault"since both would have barred the plaintiff'); see
also Davis, supra note 35, at 518 (implying that there was no difference between the
traditional rule of contributory negligence and the serious misconduct bar).
38. DOBBS, supra note 15, at 525.
39. Prentice, supra note 5, at 82. Prentice adds that except for an "occasional" New York
or Virginia case, "few U.S. tort claims today are barred by the ... defense." Id. at 87.
40. Although Professor Prentice characterized the doctrine as having "disappeared," he
has also been quick to urge preemptively that it not be rekindled as a solvent for a perceived
litigation crisis. Id. at 122.
41. See infra notes 48-100 and accompanying text. Indeed, at least one case has gone so
far as to refer to the serious misconduct bar as the "prevailing rule in American
jurisdictions." Feltner v. Casey Fain. Program, 902 P.2d 206, 208 (Wyo. 1995).
42. E.g., DOBBS, supra note 15, at 527 (saying that"[s]ome cases deserve to be dealtwith
in that way (on an all or nothing basis], but perhaps not cases in which the defendant is as
1020
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focusing on American law, Professor MacDougall's observation
about the doctrine seems apt here. He observes that "It]he doctrine
is occasionally proclaimed dead, but it tends to resurface, each new
case typically raising more questions about the nature of the
defence [sic] than it answers.""
A general rule of tort law is that the mere fact that a plaintiff
violated a criminal statute does not automatically bar his tort
claim solely based on the fact that the conduct constituted a
crime." Of course, a plaintiff's violation of a criminal statute
might concomitantly constitute contributory or, today, comparative
negligence and sometimes might on that basis support a judgment
for the defendant, especially in a modified comparative fault state.
But, the doctrinal basis for denying relief based on the contributory
and sometimes comparative fault of the plaintiff is not dependent
upon the fact that a crime may or may not have been committed.
The Restatement asserts that a person is not barred "merely
because at the time ... he was committing a tort or a crime."45 The
comments, however, are more ambiguous.46 Notwithstanding the
much at fault as the plaintiff"); Michael A. L. Balboni, Closing the Courts to Felonious
Plaintiffs Who Are Injured by Their Own Conduct: A Case for Codifying Common Sense, 25
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 393, 410 (1998) (stating that "civil remedies should not be available to
individuals who have been injured duringthe commission of crime"); Hillary Greene, Undead
Laws: The Use of Historically Unenforced Criminal Statutes in Non-Criminal Litigation, 16
YALE L. & POL'YREV. 169,170(1997) (circumscribing her repudiation of the doctrine under
her theory of"conditional desuetude," under which"nonenforcement of a criminal law would
preclude its use in secondary applications").
43. MacDougall, supra note 5, at 1 (citation omitted).
44. Greene, supra note 42, at 175 n.33 (stating that"g]enerally . .. violation of a criminal
law does not necessarily bar civil actions for injuries related to the criminal act"); Prentice,
supra note 5, at 87 (observing that "the general rule is that a plaintiffs violation of a criminal
statute may constitute contributory negligence or assumption of risk, but it generally does
not completely bar a plaintiff's recovery on ex turpi causa grounds") (citation omitted).
45. 4 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 889 (1979).
46. The comments repeat that one is not precluded by fact that he was "doing an illegal
act." Id. cmt. b. The comments then add, however, that"[nievertheless, if the injured person
has violated a statute designed to prevent a certain type of risk, he is barred from recovery
for harm caused by violation of the statute if... the harm resulted from a risk of the type
against which the statute was intended to give protection." Id. Thus, the comments seem to
equivocate. Do they endorse the serious misconduct doctrine as an exception to the general
rule? Or, do the comments merely speak in terms of the plaintiff being "barred" simply
because at the time of section 889's promulgation in 1979, comparative fault had not
sufficiently or so universally takenhold as tojustifT replacing the complete defense language
with the proportionate reduction language of comparative fault? For more recent
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general rule, however, when the plaintiffs harm arose out of his
commission of especially egregious (often criminal) misconduct, a
significant number of courts that have addressed the question treat
the mere fact that the plaintiff was engaged in serious misconduct
as potentially sufficient to bar the tort claim. Thus, these courts in
essence seem to recognize an exception or qualification to that
general rule.'7 Accordingly, the serious misconduct bar has evolved
as a freestanding construct, both independent of the preceding
general rule on criminal violations and separate from the defense
of comparative (or contributory) fault.
Getting a bead on the standing of the serious misconduct doctrine
is complicated by several factors. First, it was only after the recent
parting of the doctrine and contributory negligence (once the latter
was replaced by comparative fault) that the serious misconduct
doctrine discretely emerged. Second, even today, in many cases in
which a plaintiffs criminal conduct may have contributed to his
injury, the courts do not focus on the serious misconduct doctrine,
but rather analyze the fact of the plaintiffs criminal conduct
exclusively within the framework of comparative fault. Third, many
jurisdictions adopting comparative fault have opted for a modified
version under which a plaintiff whose fault crosses a specified
threshold is completely barred, thus obviating the need to invoke an
independent serious misconduct bar to achieve a clean kill of the
plaintiff's claim. Despite these perturbations, however, a growing
number of courts are addressing the doctrine.
Restatement pronouncements favoring the latter interpretation, see infra notes 53,245,254.
The ambiguity of section 889 is reflected in some of the authorities. Compare Barker v.
Kallash, 468 N.E.2d 39,41 (N.Y. 1984) (relying on commentb to section 889 in support of the
serious misconduct bar), with id. at 49 (Simons, J., dissenting) (relying on the black letter
of section 889 to support its criticism of the majority opinion), Ashmore v. Cleanweld Prods.,
Inc., 672 P.2d 1230, 1231 (Or. App. 1983) (relying on section 883 and selective language of
comment b to support repudiation of the doctrine), and Prentice, supra note 5, at 87 & n.176
(interpreting section 889 as not supporting the bar).
47. See DOBBS, supra note 15, at 526 (explaining that the doctrine is a departure from
the general rule that the "plaintiff's violation of statute is ordinarily relevant ... as showing
contributory negligence, but not as forbidding the claim entirely").
[Vol. 43:10111022
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B. Factual Permutations
Cases addressing the serious misconduct doctrine have arisen in
several different types of factual settings. These settings are
described below.
1. Defendant Is Actively Injured While Engaged in Serious
Misconduct
In some cases, the plaintiff was actively injured while he was
engaged in serious misconduct. This pattern is illustrated in Oden
v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co.4 There a fourteen-year-old youth was
killed when a soft-drink vending machine fell on him while he was
attempting to steal soft drinks.49 The decedent and a friend were
attempting to tilt the machine, a technique apparently employed
earlier in the evening on other machines. Plaintiff alleged that the
machine was defective because it contained no warning or anti-theft
device, and was not secured by brackets to anchor it.50 The court
held that the claim was barred, under the rule precluding "any
action seeking damages based on injuries that were a direct result
of the injured party's knowing and intentional participation in a
crime involving moral turpitude."51 Numerous recent decisions have
approved at least some variation of the serious misconduct bar in
situations in which the plaintiff-wrongdoer was actively injured by
48. 621 So. 2d 953 (Ala. 1993). The serious misconduct bar has played a prominent role
in Alabama cases despite the fact that Alabama was one of the few states in which
contributory negligence continued to operate. In some cases the serious misconduct bar was
relied on as an alternative ground along with contributory negligence. Dapremont v.
Overcash, Walker & Co., No. CIV.A.99-0353-BH-M, 2000 WL 1566532, at *7 (S.D. Ala. Oct.
4,2000) (applying Alabama law). But, in some other cases, the serious misconduct bar has
figured more centrally because, under the particular facts presented, contributory negligence
was not applicable. Lemond Constr. Co. v. Wheeler, 669 So.2d 855,860 (Ala. 1995) (applying
the serious misconduct bar and noting that the contributory negligence defense would not
work here because the defendant failed to overcome the presumption that a child of the
victim's age was incapable of contributory negligence). See generally RESTATEMENT (THMD)
OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILrY § 7 cmt. a, reporter's note (2000) (noting that only
a few jurisdictions continue to use contributory negligence, and that there has been an
"avalanche" of jurisdictions that have adopted comparative fault).
49. Oden, 621 So. 2d at 954.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 955.
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allegedly tortious conduct by the defendant. 2 Many courts,
however, simply seem not to have focused on or even considered the
bar. And, a few have expressly rejected it. 53
52. E.g., Guadamud v. Dentply Int'l, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 433, 437 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)
(applying New York law to grant the defendant summary judgment in a products liability
action alleging that plaintiff was injured by the contents of a plastic syringe for cleaning
teeth when, at the time, plaintiffwas engaged in a dentistrypractice despite the fact that she
allegedly was not licensed either in New York or anywhere else in the United States); Oden,
621 So. 2d at 955; Ardinger v. Hummell, 982 P.2d 727, 736 (Alaska 1999) (approving bar in
principle, but finding it inapplicable to instant case because misconduct not sufficiently
"serious"); Gabriel v. Tripp, 576 So.2d 404, 405 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (noting in a
negligence claim for alleged transmission of herpes simplex virus, that "if the defendant
establishes that the plaintiffwas engaged in an illegal act at the time he or she contracted
the disease, this will bar any recovery"); Manning v. Brown, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (N.Y. 1997)
(barring plaintiff allegedly participating in "joyriding" by unauthorized use of a vehicle that
was driven by defendant who was another unauthorized and unlicensed user); Symone T. v.
Lieber, 613 N.Y.S.2d 404,406 (App. Div. 1994) (approving application of the bar to a claim
by a twelve-year-old rape victim who underwent an illegal abortion ifit were established that
"she willfully submitted to an abortion which she knew to be illegal"); Lee v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 497 S.E.2d 328 (Va. 1998) (holding that thirteen-year-old plaintiff riding with a
sixteen-year-old driver who, along with the daughter of the car's owner, allegedly took the
car without the owner's consent, was barred from recovering for injuries suffered as a result
of the driver's alleged negligence); Zysk v. Zysk, 404 S.E.2d 721 (Va. 1990) (barring claim by
plaintiff who allegedly contracted herpes simplex virus from the defendant with whom she
had engaged in consensual sexual intercourse shortly before their marriage thereby
committing the crime of fornication); cf. Exparte W.D.J., 785 So. 2d 390, 392-93 (Ala. 2000)
(addressing issue of whether to order a criminal offender to pay restitution to the victim who
was riding with the defendant on an underlying charge of assault in causing bodily injury
with a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, and holding that the victim cannot
maintain a cause of action if he must rely on an illegal or immoral act to which he was a
party); Robinson v. City of Detroit, 613 N.W.2d 307, 314 (Mich. 2000) (holding that there is
no duty owed to passengers injured in a vehicle fleeing a police pursuit if it is ultimately
determined that those passengers were themselves also wrongdoers); Lewis v. Miller, 543
A.2d 590, 592 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (stating that damages could not be recovered nor
comparative negligence applied where the death of the victim arose from his "wanton"
misconduct in drag racing on a rounded curve while he was intoxicated); id. at 593 (Popovich,
J., concurring) (referring to the "unmitigated temerity to demand financial redress for [the]
injuries received"). The currentposture ofthe serious misconduct barimay sometimes depend
on the interpretation of statutory provisions. InAlaska, for example, two statutoryprovisions
were amended in 1997, subsequent to the date of the injuries in many of the Alaska cases.
Compare ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.900 (Michie 2000) (stating, inter alia, that fault includes
intentional conduct toward the victim or others), with id. § 09.65.210 (precluding recovery,
inter alia, for harm to person convicted of and injured while engaged in a felony or operating
a vehicle or craft while under the influence, or injured while engaged in or avoiding
apprehension for specified felonies or operating a vehicle or craft while under the influence).
53. See Long v. Adams, 333 S.E.2d 852, 855 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (rejecting the bar in a
case for allegedly negligent transmission of herpes simplex virus, and stating that"[i]t is well
established that a person can recover in tort for injury suffered as a result of his own
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2. Defendant Actively Contributed to the Commission of Serious
Misconduct
A second factual pattern arises where the defendant's allegedly
tortious conduct does not directly inflict a harm on the victim
through some physical impact, but does actively contribute to the
victim's commission of the serious misconduct from which the
victim's harm materialized. The most famous case54 arising in
this factual permutation is Barker v. Kallash."5 A fifteen-year-old
youth was injured when a "pipe bomb"56 that he was allegedly
constructing exploded. A tort claim was asserted against both a
criminal activity"); Adams v. Smith, 201 S.E.2d 639, 642-43 (Ga. Ct. App. 1973) (approving
the basic idea that "a person does not become an outlaw and lose all rights" because he was
committing an illegal act) (citation omitted); Goldfuss v. Davidson, 679 N.E.2d 1099, 1104
(Ohio 1997) (recognizing ability of a person injured while engaged in criminal conduct to
recover in tort); see also RESTATEMENT (THIM) OF TORTS § 7 cmt. d (2000) (advocating
comparative fault "even though a party's conduct violated a statute ... unless the purpose
of the statute... is to place the entire responsibility for such harm on the party"); id. § 8 cmt.
c., reporter's note. The Restatement reporters note reads, with respect to the violation of
statute rules, that
tilt is highly unlikely that a legislature intended to affect the way a court
applies comparative responsibility. Thus, the factfinder should consider
circumstances that would be relevant to a finding of negligence in the absence
of a statute, even though those circumstances would not be relevant to whether
violation of the statute constitutes negligence per se.
Id. For more confusing Restatement language, however, see supra notes 45-46 and
accompanying text.
Although the plaintiff in Goldfuss was shot while allegedly trying to break into the
defendant's barn in order to steal, plaintiffcouched his tort theory as a negligence claim. The
court expressly rejected what it referred to as the "public policy" defense. Goldfuss, 679
N.E.2d at 1104. For a discussion of the disagreement among pre-1970 abortion cases, see
Leslie Reagan, Victim orAccomplice?: Crime, Medical Malpractice, and the Construction of
theAborting Woman inAmerican CaseLaw, 1860s-1970, 10 COLUM.J. GENDER&L. 311,320-
30 (2001) (noting that "[tlhroughout the century of illegal abortion, the courts divided into
two camps on the question" ofwhether someone could recover in tort for harm resulting from
an illegal abortion). Georgia courts, however, sometimes seem to come close to the serious
misconduct doctrine by characterizing the victim's misconduct as at least a version of
assumption ofrisk. Cf Mudovanv. McEachern, 523 S.E.2d 566, 570 (Ga. 1999) (barring claim
for the death of a person knowingly participating in a game of alleged "Russian Roulette").
54. Not only has the most famous case endorsing the serious misconduct bar been a pipe-
bomb case, but the pipe-bomb cases also attest to the unpredictability of the doctrine. See
infra notes 281-84 and accompanying text.
55. 468 N.E.2d 39 (N.Y. 1984).
56. The device consisted of a metal pipe three to four inches long and one inch wide. Id.
at 40.
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nine-year-old child who allegedly sold the firecrackers from which
the plaintiff extracted the gun powder with which to construct the
bomb, and the nine-year-old's parents. The court held that "because
the plaintiff's grievous criminal conduct ... was so plainly violative
of paramount public safety interests, the public policy of this State
dictates that recovery be denied."5 7 The court noted that the
wrongdoer should not be permitted to "profit""8 from his wrong, and
courts should not "lend assistance"59 to one seeking compensation
under such circumstances.
Two Alaska cases further illustrate application of the bar in this
factual pattern. In one case, 0 the third-party plaintiff shot and
killed a person with a shotgun, and was convicted of manslaughter
for the fatal shooting. He thereafter sued the manufacturer and
seller of the shotgun, alleging that the firearm had a defect that
caused it to discharge accidentally. Therefore, the shooter asserted,
the firearm suppliers should be liable for his conviction and prison
sentence for manslaughter. Based on the shooter's criminal conduct
of at least intentionally pointing a shotgun toward the victim, the
court held, inter alia, that the third-party plaintiff was precluded
from recovering from the gun suppliers.61
In a later Alaska case, another plaintiff was convicted of
kidnapping, raping, and assaulting a woman with whom he had left
the Fogcutter bar.62 He sued the bar and its bartender, contending
that they were responsible for his thirty-year prison sentence and
incarceration because he was served numerous drinks when he was
drunk (which presumably he would contend contributed to his
criminal acts).6" The court held that the plaintiffs serious criminal
conduct barred his claim.64
57. Id. at 46.
58. Id. at 41.
59. Id. at 43.
60. Adkinson v. Rossi Arms Co., 659 P.2d 1236 (Alaska 1983). See generally supra note
52 (noting statutes in Alaska).
61. Adkinson, 659 P.2d at 1240. The court further held that the defendant's duty to the
plaintiff-shooter did not encompass protectinghim from his intentional criminal conduct. Id.
at 1239-40.
62. Lord v. Fogcutter Bar, 813 P.2d 660 (Alaska 1991).
63. Id. at 662-63.
64. Id. at 663.
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A number of other recent cases reach a similar result in factual
scenarios falling within this general factual permutation.65 A few
cases have also expressly rejected the doctrine in these types of
circumstances.66
3. Defendant Failed to Prevent the Plaintiff from Engaging in
the Serious Misconduct
A third type of situation also arises from allegations that the
defendant tortiously contributed to the plaintiffs commission of the
conduct from which his injury materialized. Here, however, the
defendant is not alleged to have actively contributed, but rather to
have failed to prevent the plaintiff from committing the acts despite
a duty that was otherwise owed to the plaintiff by the defendant.
Take, for example, the case of Rimert v. Mortell.67 The psychotic
plaintiff was convicted of killing four people. He thereafter brought
a medical malpractice claim, alleging that 'he was negligently
discharged. The court held that plaintiffs claim was barred, stating
that a person "convicted of a crime should be precluded from
imposing liability upon others ... for the results of his or her own
65. See, e.g., Dapremontv. Overcash, Walker& Co., No. CIV.A.99-0353-BH-M, 2000 WL
1566532, at *5-*6 (S.D. Ala Oct. 4, 2000) (applying Alabama law to bar plaintiff convicted
of income tax evasion from recovering from his accountant for malpractice for failure to
report income for an entity where plaintiff never disclosed to the accountant that he was a
"related party" to the entity although such information was supposed to be disclosed in
fimancial statements and annual audits); Anderson v. Miller, 559 N.W.2d 29,34 (Iowa 1997)
(barring claim for death of person who was killed while driving a truck while intoxicated
against the person who allegedly negligently entrusted the vehicle to him); Orzel v. Scott
Drug Co., 537 N.W.2d 208, 210 (Mich. 1995) (barring claim by plaintiff, who alleged that
defendants negligently supplied him with methamphetamines resulting in his addiction,
because plaintiff was violating the Controlled Substances Act by obtaining and using
methamphetamines without a valid prescription); Feltnerv. Casey Faro. Program, 902 P.2d
206(Wyo. 1995) (barring claimby nineteen-year-old-who pled guilty to fourth-degree sexual
assault for engaging in sexual intercourse with a fourteen-year-old girl who had been placed
in the home of plaintiffs parents-against defendant for alleged negligence in placing the
child in the home after plaintiffs parents had advised defendant that they would not accept
female children allegedly exhibiting overtly sexual behavior).
66. See Ashmore v. Cleanweld Products, Inc., 672 P.2d 1230 (Or. Ct. App. 1983); Kelly
v. Moguls, 632 A.2d 360,363 (Vt. 1993) (rejecting argument that allowing claim for injury to
imbiber-victim would permit an "individual to profit from his own wrongdoing"); see also
supra notes 46, 53; infra notes 246, 255 (same).
67. 680 N.E.2d 867 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
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criminal conduct" 8 at least if he was "legally responsible for the
criminal act."69 A number of other courts have also applied the bar
in cases matching this factual permutation.7 °
Occasionally a court will even apply the bar to claims for failure
to prevent suicide, barring the claim based on the perceived
misconduct represented by the suicide.7' For example, in Pappas v.
Clark,2 a malpractice claim was brought by a spouse for the suicide
of her husband, alleging that the defendant-physician should have
recognized and treated decedent's condition.7" The court held that
the claim was "barred by the public policy ... which generally
denies relief to those injured in whole or in part because of their
own illegal acts." 4 There have, however, been relatively few cases
68. Id. at 874.
69. Id. The court barred the claim finding that plaintiff was sufficiently responsible for
his wrongful conduct for the purposes of the bar despite the fact that the plaintiff had been
found "guilty but mentally ill" in the criminal case. Id. at 875. And, to make matters worse,
the court acknowledged the unfairness here, stating that "punishment of mentally ill
offenders who possess some reduced degree of criminal culpability seems problematic." Id.
70. See, e.g., Burcina v. City of Ketchikan, 902 P.2d 817, 818 (Alaska 1995) (barring
recovery by plaintiff, who was convicted of arson, against mental health facility and
psychiatrist for alleged negligent treatment that aggravated the mental condition that
caused him to set the fire); Cole v. Taylor, 301 N.W.2d 766 (Iowa 1981) (barring malpractice
claim by plaintiff against psychiatrist for alleged negligence in failing to prevent plaintiff
from killing her former husband); Cork v. St. Charles County, 10 S.W.3d 608, 609 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2000) (barring a tort claim by plaintiff convicted of violating environmental law by
allowing pollutants from truck to run off, who alleged that defendants failed to properly train
him or obtain a disposal permit); Johnson v. State, 687 N.Y.S.2d 761 (App. Div. 1999)
(barring recovery, as an alternative holding, by plaintiff's decedent against police for alleged
negligence in failing to prevent the escape and accidental death of the decedent, who had
been arrested for driving while intoxicated); Tillmon v. New York City Hous. Auth., 609
N.Y.S.2d 239,240 (App. Div. 1994) (barring claim for alleged negligence in allowing elevator
to become dangerous to the minor-decedent who was engaging in "elevator surfing" by
climbing out of the elevator car through the escape hatch, and who was decapitated when
after urinating into the elevator shaft, he bent over to close his pants and hit a concrete
stanchion in the elevator shaft).
71. Pappas v. Clark, 494 N.W.2d 245 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 246. Plaintiff also alleged that the defendant-pharmacist should have alerted
other defendant-pharmacies that decedentwas obtaining illegal prescriptions, and that other
pharmacies failed to adequately check decedent's requests for prescriptions. Id.
74. Id. at 247,248; see also Wackwitz v. Roy, 418 S.E.2d 861 (Va. 1992) (acknowledging
possible application of the serious misconduct bar in principle to suicide cases, but saying
that it would not apply ifthe decedent was of unsound mind when he committed suicide). But
see Greene v. Guarino, 25 Va. Cir. 162, 163 (1991) (refusing to apply the bar to a wrongful
death claim against psychiatrist for allegedly contributing to the decedent's suicide, despite
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applying the serious misconduct bar to suicides, and a number of
cases have refused to apply it for various reasons.75 This dearth of
case law probably reflects the fact that the courts are not even in
agreement on whether to allow application of a comparative fault
defense in suicide claims,76 let alone the complete bar trip-wire rule
of the serious misconduct doctrine.
4. Defendant Failed to Prevent Adverse Consequences from
Serious Misconduct
A fourth factual setting for the serious misconduct bar arises
when plaintiff seeks to recover damages from a defendant who
allegedly failed to prevent or mitigate the consequences of the
plaintiffs misconduct. This factual pattern can be illustrated by the
facts in Hernandez v. Yoon. 7 The plaintiff-patient, who at the time
was married, underwent a vasectomy. He thereafter brought a
malpractice action against the physician who performed the
sterilization procedure." The plaintiff alleged that notwithstanding
the vasectomy, he had impregnated his girlfriend. He sought
damages for psychological injury, claiming that not only did he
impregnate his girlfriend, but also that she subsequently had to
the fact that the bar is commonly recognized by Virginia cases in other contexts). See
generally Molchon v. Tyler, 546 S.E.2d 691, 695 (Va. 2001) (holding that the serious
misconduct bar was not applicable if the illegal act consisted of the victim's suicide resulting
from the victim's unsoundness of mind).
75. Joseph v. State, 26 P.3d 459 (Alaska 2001) (approving the serious misconduct bar in
principle, but requiring inter alia that the misconduct be criminal and intentionally
threatening to the safety of others, and thus refusing to apply it to an act of suicide).
76. Compare White v. Lawrence, 975 S.W.2d 525, 530-31 (Tenn. 1998) (holding that
comparative fault does not apply"where the defendants duty of care includes preventing the
... self-destructive acts that caused the plaintiffs injury") (citation omitted), with Hobart v.
Shin, 705 N.E.2d 907, 911 (Ill. 1998) (applying comparative fault to suicide except where
decedent was so mentally ill that she was incapable of being contributorily negligent). See
generally Patricia C. Kussman, Annotation, Liability of Doctor, Psychiatrist, or Psychologist
for Failure to Take Steps to Prevent Patient's Suicide, 81 A.L.R.5th 167, §§ 2, 11-13 (2000)
(observing that when there is a duty owed to a patient, courts have been reluctant to apply
comparative fault, although there is a split of authority); Robert K. Jenner & Bryant Welch,
Suicide Watch: Liability for Negligent Psychiatric Care, TRIAL, May 2001, at 20, 22 (noting
that most courts refuse to allow the comparative fault defense in suicide cases for negligent
psychiatric care).
77. 661 N.Y.S.2d 753 (Sup. Ct. 1997).
78. Id. at 754.
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undergo an abortion.79 The court recognized the applicability of the
serious misconduct bar here in principle,8 ° but refused to apply it on
the merits in the instant case because it believed that adultery did
not rise to the level of a "serious crime."8 ' The serious misconduct
bar has been applied in the fourth type of situation when the injury
arose out of more serious acts of misconduct.8 2
An important subgroup of the fourth factual pattern arises in
legal malpractice cases involving criminal prosecutions. Numerous
courts have applied a variation of the serious misconduct bar to
legal malpractice claims brought by accused persons against their
criminal defense attorneys. When a former client claims that he
was convicted, entered a guilty plea, or suffered some other adverse
legal consequences, and that he would have achieved a less onerous
outcome had his criminal defense counsel not been negligent, a
clear majority of cases addressing the matter have denied recovery
unless evidence establishes that the accused was actually innocent
of the crime. 3 As Judge Posner succinctly put it, the plaintiff must
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. E.g., Tate v. Derifield, 510 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1994). Here the plaintiff-spouse sued
for loss of consortium based on the incarceration of her husband. She alleged that the
defendant-informant had provided false information that provided grounds for a search
warrant that produced evidence that resulted in her husband's imprisonment. Id. at 887. The
court denied recovery, holding that "it would be wrong as a matter of public policy to allow
recovery on a consortium claim which arose from the lawful incarceration of a spouse." Id.
at 888.
83. Levine v. Kling, 123 F.3d 580, 582 (7th Cir. 1997) (applying Illinois law and noting
that most cases deny recovery unless the plaintiff can establish that he was innocent of the
crime); Wiley v. County of San Diego, 966 P.2d 983, 985 (Cal. 1998) (stating that a "clear
majority of courts that have considered the question" require proof of plaintifis innocence);
Glenn v. Aiken, 569 N.E.2d 783, 785 (Mass. 1991) (stating that "[c]ourts have generally
required that a former criminal defendant prove his innocence of the crime charged as an
element of his claim that his former trial counsel was negligent in defending him"); Brown
v. Theos, 526 S.E.2d 232,235 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999) (statingthat most courts require the client
to prove innocence of the crime as an element to the cause of action), affd, 550 S.E.2d 304
(S.C. 2001); see, e.g., Howarthv. State, 925 P.2d 1330,1335 (Alaska 1996) (stating that"[olne
whose intentional criminal acts result in incarceration cannot recover damages associated
with that incarceration from others whose conduct may also have caused or contributed to
the incarceration"); Rowe v. Schreiber, 725 So.2d 1245, 1251 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)
(holding that the plaintiff must "prove by the greater weight of the evidence that he was
innocent of the crimes charged in the underlying criminal proceeding"); Moore v. Owens, 698
N.E.2d 707, 709 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (adopting a rule requiring "the criminal defendant to
prove his innocence in a later legal malpractice action against his criminal defense counsel");
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prove that he was in fact innocent and "not just lucky." 4 Many
cases have also required (often in addition to the innocence
requirement), in cases involving claims for harms based on
convictions, that a plaintiff may not recover damages unless he
has successfully sought postconviction relief in the criminal
proceedings.8 5
Ray v. Stone, 952 S.W.2d 220, 224 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that innocence is a
prerequisite); Labovitz v. Feinberg, 713 N.E.2d 379,382 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999) (holding that
a person suing his former attorney for malpractice in connection with representation in a
criminal case must prove that he was innocent of the crime charged); Mahoney v. Shaheen,
Cappiello, Stein & Gordon, 727 A.2d 996, 998-99 (N.H. 1999) (holding that "a criminal
malpractice action will fail if the claimant does not allege and prove, by a preponderance of
the evidence, actual innocence"); Biegen v. Paul K. Rooney, P.C., 703 N.Y.S.2d 121, 121-22
(App. Div. 2000) (holding that public policy prevents claim by the plaintiff who cannot prove
his innocence); Adkins v. Dixon, 482 S.E.2d 797, 802 (Va. 1997) (holding inter alia that the
plaintiff was required to allege his actual innocence to the charges). But see Vahila v. Hall,
674 N.E.2d 1164,1169-70 (Ohio 1997) (implying that plaintiff does not have to establish that
she was actually innocent or even necessarily that she would have prevailed at trial, if she
can prove the elements of legal malpractice, including demonstrating "that there [was] a
causal connection between the conduct complained of and the resulting damage or loss");
RSTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 53 cmt. d (1998) (noting that
although most jurisdictions addressing the issue require proof of actual innocence, under the
Restatement "it is not necessary to prove that the convicted defendant was in fact innocent").
The Restatement does, however, say that when the plaintiff seeks damages for causing his
conviction, he must have had that conviction set aside "When process for that relief on the
grounds asserted in the malpractice action is available." Id.
84. Kling, 123 F.3d at 583 (applying Illinois law).
85. See Cosciav. McKenna & Cuneo, 25 P.3d 670,676 (Cal. 2001) (stating that"a plaintiff
must obtain postconviction relief in the form ofa final disposition of the underlying criminal
case.., as a prerequisite to proving actual innocence in a malpractice action against former
criminal defense counsel," and referring to it as the majority rule); Berringer v. Steele, 758
A.2d 574, 591-92,597 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (commenting that"[mlany courts hold that
successful post conviction relief is a predicate to maintenance of a criminal malpractice
action," and stating in connection with alleged harms based on the conviction, but not for the
sentencing, that"appellate, post conviction, or habeas relief, dependent upon attorney error,
[is a predicate to recovery in a criminal malpractice action, when the claim is based on an
alleged deficiency forwhich appellate, post conviction, orhabeas reliefwouldbe available");
Gibson v. Trant, 58 S.W. 3d 103,117 (Tenn. 2001) (stating that"a plaintiff cannot prevail in
a 'criminal malpractice' case against his defense lawyer unless he proves that he has
obtained post-conviction relief"). Some cases, however, seem reluctant to endorse this
requirement. Gebhardt v. O'Rourke, 510 N.W.2d 900, 908 (Mich. 1994) (addressing
exclusively a statute of limitations issue, but in doing so, saying "that successful
postconviction relief is not prerequisite to the maintenance of a claim for legal malpractice
arising out of negligent representation in a criminal matter"); Krahn v. Kinney, 538 N.E.2d
1058, 1061-62 (Ohio 1989) (holding, in a case alleging that the attorney failed to convey offer
by prosecutor to dismiss criminal charges against plaintiff in exchange for cooperation, that
the plaintiff did not have to prove reversal of conviction for ineffective counsel in order to sue
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The serious misconduct bar operates somewhat differently here
than it normally does outside the legal malpractice setting. Usually,
the bar is a defense to be raised by the defendant. When, however,
the plaintiff sues his attorney for legal malpractice for substandard
representation in a criminal matter, most courts make proof of
innocence of the plaintiff-accused an additional prerequisite in the
plaintiffs case on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof.8
Some courts approving the innocence requirement have sought
to explain it simply as a manifestation of the causation element 7 in
for legal malpractice but still must prove that his damages were proximately caused by the
alleged malpractice). Courts requiring that a plaintiff obtain postconviction relief have
developed a variety of approaches to the matter of the statute of limitation. Coscia, 25 P.3d
at 677-80.
The extent to which the requirement of securing postconviction relief differs from the
innocence requirement depends on applicable constitutional law and criminal procedure, and
is beyond the scope of this Article. Suffice it to say that to the extent that a person might be
entitled to postconviction relief based upon a showing of other than factual innocence, the
requirement of securing postconviction reliefmay differfrom the requirement ofestablishing
actual factual innocence. For background on this complex topic, see generally WAYNE R.
LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 11.7(d), 11.9, 11.10(d), 27.6, 28.3(g) (3d ed. 2000).
Thus, the two requirements may not be completely coterminous. And, indeed, a number of
courts addressing the requirements suggest their separateness. See, e.g., Coscia, 25 P.3d at
671 (referring to the two issues as "distinct, but related" questions); Theos, 526 S.E.2d at 235;
Gibson, 58 S.W. 3d at 111. Occasionally, a court seems to meld the two requirements into an
especially demanding formulation. Peeler v. Hughes & Luce, 909 S.W.2d 494, 497-98 (Tex.
1995) (holding that plaintiffs must demonstrate that "they have been exonerated on direct
appeal, through post-conviction relief, or otherwise"); Owens v. Harmon, 28 S.W.3d 177,179
(Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (stating "that a person convicted of a crime cannot pursue a malpractice
claim against his attorney unless he has established his innocence by direct appeal, post-
conviction relief, or other legal proceedings").
86. Most cases place the burden of proof for the innocence issue on the plaintiff. See, e.g.,
.Rowe, 725 So.2d at 1251; Moore, 698 N.E.2d at 709. At least one case, however, placed the
burden of proof on that issue on the defendant in the malpractice claim. See Shaw v. State,
861 P.2d 566, 573 (Alaska 1993) (holding that the burden of proving actual guilt is on the
defendant who may raise the issue as an affirmative defense).
87. On the causation requirement in legal malpractice cases, see generally Nielson v.
Eisenhower & Carlson, 999 P.2d 42, 47 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (noting that "[clourts have
consistently applied the 'but for' test in legal malpractice cases"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 53 cmt. d (1998) (noting that an accused suing his attorney
for malpractice must prove "that [his] lawyer failed to act properly and that, but for that
failure, the result would have been different, for example because a double-jeopardy defense
would have prevented conviction"); DOBBS, supra note 15, at 1391 (noting that in legal
malpractice based on an adverse outcome judgement, the plaintiff often must essentially
prove a "trial within a trial or case within a case"); Lawrence W. Kessler, Alternative
Liability in Litigation MalpracticeActions: Eradicating the LastResort ofScoundrels, 37 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 401 (2000).
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legal malpractice."8 That cannot be correct, however. It is clearly a
new precondition to recovery in addition to the causation element.
Manifestly, a criminal defense attorney's negligence can cause harm
to a client even if the accused did in fact commit the crime as
charged. 9 Take for example the case of Peeler v. Hughes & Luce.9
There the plaintiffs criminal defense attorney allegedly failed to
communicate to the plaintiff-accused that the prosecutor had
offered her absolute transactional immunity.91 Thereafter, plaintiff
entered into a plea agreement admitting guilt to one count.92
Obviously, the plaintiff could have suffered a significant loss by the
lost opportunity to receive immunity, even if she had in fact
committed the offense as charged.93 Nevertheless, the court denied
recovery, holding that the plaintiff must demonstrate that she had
"been exonerated on direct appeal, through post-conviction relief, or
otherwise."94 A number of opinions have accurately explained that
88. E.g., Ray, 952 S.W.2d at 223. One might question how convinced even the Ray court
was ofits attempt to hang the innocence requirement on the causation element. Why did the
court at various times invoke at least three different conceptual foundations for the
innocence requirement? It also relied on a proximate cause hook. Id. at 244. And, ultimately
it gravitated toward the serious misconduct bar. Id. Clearly, causation would not work
because presumably a plaintiff could, even if actually guilty, still prove that his attorney's
malpractice caused him harm. He might show, for example, that if the attorney had prepared
a better defense, he would have received a more favorable sentence at trial or would have
pled to a lesser charge. Or, perhaps a defense attorney failed to communicate an offer of a
plea bargain or immunity agreement. Similarly, proximate cause does not work because the
type of harm was obviously a materialization of the kind of risk (e.g., passing up a plea
bargain) that the lawyer was retained to avoid. That leaves the last conceptual hook, the
serious misconduct idea, which is the focus of this Article.
89. Susan P. Koniak, Through the Looking Glass ofEthics and the Wrong with Rights We
Find There, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 10 (1995).
90. 909 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. 1995).
91. Id. at 496.
92. Id.
93. See also Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo, 25 P.3d 670, 676 (Cal. 2001) (stating that "a
plaintiffrmust obtain postconviction relief in the form of a final disposition of the underlying
criminal case... as a prerequisite to proving actual innocence in a malpractice action against
former criminal defense counselr). In Coscia, the plaintiffpleaded guilty to one felony count
of conspiracy to violate federal securities laws. Id. at 671. He alleged that he was negligently
dissuaded by one of his attorneys from offering to trade information regarding another
ongoing securities fraud in exchange for the prosecutor's agreement to a misdemeanor plea.
Id. at 671-72.
94. Peeler, 909 S.W.2d at 498. The actual innocence requirement and the exoneration
rule of Peeler may not be coterminous. Proof of exoneration through postconviction
procedures is a different process than demonstrating innocence in the malpractice case.
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the innocence requirement is additive, imposing a new precondition
to recovery in addition to, and that goes beyond, the traditional
causation element in legal malpractice.95
Although numerous courts have approved an innocence
requirement, they have seldom adequately explained what they
mean by "innocence." The concept of innocence could mean .legal
innocence in the sense that the plaintiffs guilt could not be
established on the basis of the evidence that would have been
produced had plaintiffs legal representation comported with
constitutional and applicable professional standards. Or, the
concept of innocence could be equated with factual innocence,
meaning that the accused did not engage in the criminal behavior
of which he was accused. Most likely, courts invoking an innocence
requirement have had the latter, factual innocence, connotation in
mind." Thus, the court in Glenn v. Aiken"7 explained the distinction
between "guilt in fact and legal guilt"98 with the following
illustrations:
[f a defendant attorney failed to assert a clearly valid defense
of the statute of limitations, a client who did commit the crime,
but should not have been convicted of it, sustained a real loss,
but he may not recover against the attorney defendant.
... A negligent failure to move to suppress evidence seized in
clear violation of the defendant's constitutional or statutory
rights could lead to a conviction that would have been totally
forestalled by the allowance of a motion to suppress. Such a
former criminal defendant might well not be able to prove his
There is also the question of whether an accused who is actually guilty could still be
.exonerated" in the criminal proceedings (for example, because of the higher burden on
prosecutors in criminal cases). In any event, the court in Peeler seems to assume that these
are the same, by referring with approval to the requirement of proof of innocence, and by
characterizing the plaintiff as an "admittedly guilty person." Id. at 498.
95. E.g., Levine v. Eling, 123 F.3d 580, 582-83 (7th Cir. 1997) (applying Ilhinois law);
Glenn v. Aiken, 569 N.E.2d 783 (Mass. 1991).
96. E.g., Kling, 123 F.3d at 582 (applying Illinois law) (approving an innocence
requirement and rejecting the view that a malpractice plaintiffwho was "guilty in fact" would
be entitled to recover); Glenn, 569 N.E.2d at 783; O'Blennis v. Adolf, 691 S.W.2d 498, 503
(Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that the "factual innocence" of the accused is indispensable in
a legal malpractice claim based upon representation of an accused in a criminal matter).
97. Glenn, 569 N.E.2d at 783.
98. Id. at 787.
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innocence of such a crime and, under the cases that make proof
of his innocence an element of his case against his former
attorney, the attorney would be free from liability. 9
Legal malpractice cases are notoriously difficult to win,1 °0 what
with the reluctance of attorneys to serve as counsel or as expert
witnesses in such cases and the already difficult causation hurdle
to overcome. The serious misconduct bar in its innocence
requirement incantation adds another formidable, practically
insurmountable hurdle for plaintiffs seeking damages for negligent
legal representation in a criminal matter.
C. Fuzzy Prerequisites
1. "Serious" Misconduct
The parameters of the serious misconduct doctrine tend to vary
from state to state and according to the type of factual setting in
which the plaintiffs harm arose. Consider, for example, the special
rules developed for legal malpractice claims against criminal
defense attorneys. Although the serious misconduct doctrine is
generally deemed a defense when applied in personal injury claims,
proof of actual innocence is usually considered an element that the
plaintiff must establish in legal malpractice claims against
attorneys for their defense in criminal prosecutions. 1 '
The most common prerequisite for the serious misconduct bar
is that the plaintiff's misconduct must have been serious.02
1
99. Id. (approving the innocence requirement); see also Ming, 123 F.3d at 582 (applying
Illinois law) (noting that 'because of the heavy burden of proof in a criminal case, an
acquittal doesn't mean that the defendant did not commit the crime.., all it means is that
the government was not able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed it").
100. Kessler, supra note 87, at 424 (saying that "legal malpractice actions can be some of
the most difficult cases to establish"); see also RESTATEMENT(THIRD)OFTHELAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS §§ 48, 52 & cmt. g (2000) (discussing the elements of a legal malpractice claim).
101. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
102. E.g., Orzel v. Scott Drug Co., 537 N.W.2d 208, 214 (Mich. 1995) (applying standard
of "serious misconduct sufficient to bar a cause of action"); Manning v. Brown, 689 N.E.2d
1382, 1384 (N.Y. 1997) (stating that conduct must have constituted "such a serious violation
of the law that she should be precluded, as a matter of public policy, from recovery"); Barker
v. Kallash, 468 N.E.2d 39, 41 (N.Y. 1984) (approving public policy bar in principle when
"intentional participation in a criminal act" could be "so serious an offense as to warrant
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Unfortunately, the courts have seldom adequately articulated the
criteria for determining whether a plaintiff's misconduct has
crossed the "serious" threshold. A few cases have attempted to offer
some guidance. In Ardinger v. Hummell,0 3 plaintiff's minor sonwas
killed when the car he was driving, which had been allegedly
negligently entrusted to him by defendant's minor daughter, struck
a utility pole.' Although the court approved the doctrine, it refused
to find the conduct of the decedent driver sufficiently serious,
holding that the plaintiffs conduct must involve "serious criminal
conduct that intentionally threatened the safety of others."0 5 Other
courts have noted that "[ciases where recovery has been barred or
would be barred because the plaintiff was engaged in criminal
activity at the time of injury frequently involve conduct dangerous
to physical well-being."0 6 And in Poch v. Anderson, °7 the court held
that the conduct must be prohibited or almost entirely prohibited.'
Some cases have offered a boilerplate of purple prose to elaborate
on the seriousness requirement, saying in effect that the
misconduct must be serious and they "really mean it." For example,
in a concurring opinion in the seminal Barker case, Justice Jasen
denial of recovery"); Pfeffer v. Pernick, 268 A.D.2d 262,262 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (approving
rule in principle that misconduct could be "so serious as to warrant denial of recovery");
Hernandez v. Yoon, 661 N.Y.S.2d 753, 754 (Sup. Ct. 1997) (recognizing bar in principle, but
refusing to apply it to act of adultery because it was not deemed a "serious crime"). In
Hernandez, a malpractice action was brought by a patient who underwent a vasectomy. Id.
The patient sought recovery for psychological injury claiming that he impregnated his
girlfriend, and that she subsequently had to undergo an abortion. Id. The defendant
contended that the claim should be barred because the injuries arose from adultery. Id. The
court recognized the defense in principle, but refused to apply it in the instant case because
adultery did not rise to the level of a "serious crime." Id.
103. 982 P.2d 727 (Alaska 1999).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 736.
106. Hernandez, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 754; see also Josephv. State, 26 P.3d 459,477-78 (Alaska
2001) (approving the serious misconduct in principle, but requiring inter alia that the
misconduct be criminal and intentionally threaten the safety of others, and thus refusing to
apply it to the act of suicide).
107. 580 N.W.2d 456 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).
108. Id. at 458 (elaborating that the misconduct must have been more than a mere
violation of a "safety statute"); see also Orzel, 537 N.W.2d at 214 (stating that the conduct
must have been prohibited); Manning; 689 N.E.2d at 1384 (stating that the conduct must
have been "entirely prohibited by law" rather than merely regulated as to its manner);
Barker, 468 N.E.2d at 41 (stating that conduct must not be merely regulated, but must have
been entirely prohibited).
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wrote separately to offer boundaries for the rule."9 He said the rule
applies to "wrongdoing that is morally reprehensible, heinous, or
gravely injurious to the public interests"110 and that the "violation
must be either gravely immoral or grievously injurious to the public
interests.""' In Lemond Construction Co. v. Wheeler," the court
held that plaintiff's misconduct must have constituted a crime
involving moral turpitude."' The court defined this as "one
involving conduct with an inherent quality of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in regard to the duties one owes to society.""" Although
the court recognized the serious misconduct bar in principle, it
found it inapplicable to an accident in which the thirteen-year-old
decedent was killed whilejoy riding with an underage driver.' The
unpredictability of the doctrine can be readily seen here by the
fact that two years earlier the same court applied the serious
misconduct bar under the "moral turpitude" rule in a case in which
a fourteen-year-old was killed when a vending machine fell on him
while he was attempting to steal soft drinks." 6
To further confound matters, one court added that the defense
was not applicable when "the defendant's culpability for the
damages is greater than the plaintiffs culpability."" 7 Moreover, this
raises the additional question of how much the bar would add in
109. Barker, 468 N.E.2d at 45 (Jasen, J., concurring).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. 669 So.2d 855 (Ala. 1995).
113. Id. at 861; see also Oden v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., 621 So.2d 953, 955 (Ala. 1993)
(stating that the doctrine bars "any action seeking damages based on injuries that were a
direct result ofthe injured party's knowing and intentional participation in a crime involving
moral turpitude").
114. Lemond, 669 So.2d at 861.
115. Id. at 860. The decedent's father had sued, inter alia, the contractor for road
construction in the area for allegedly leaving the roadway in a dangerous condition and
without adequate warning signs. Id. at 858.
116. Oden, 621 So.2d at 955.
117. Poch v. Anderson, 580 N.W.2d 456, 458 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998); see also Rosenick v.
Chain, No. 214298, 2001 WL 776737 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2001). In Rosenick, although
approving the serious misconduct rule in principle, the court refused to apply it where the
defendant's culpability was allegedly greater than the plaintiff's. Id. at *2. The plaintiff
alleged that the defendant-physician, during the course of providing psychiatric counseling,
engaged in sexual relations with the plaintiff and exploited the therapist-patient
relationship. Id. at *1. The court noted that the plaintiffs "adultery does not relieve
defendant of... greater culpability because the adulterous relationship occurred within the
context of a physician-patient relationship." Id. at *4.
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those jurisdictions that have adopted a modified comparative fault
defense.
Some courts state that the plaintiff must have been "legally
responsible for the criminal act."l1 s Even this prerequisite is not
entirely clear. In Rimert v. Mortell,"9 the plaintiff, a psychotic
patient, sued for medical malpractice because he was discharged
and thereafter killed four people, for which he was later con-
victed. 20 Although the court recognized the requirement that the
plaintiff must have been legally responsible for his crime, it
nevertheless held that it was sufficient that the plaintiff was found
"guilty but mentally ill" in the criminal case. 121 The court acknowl-
edged the unfairness of applying the bar here, saying that
"punishment of mentally ill offenders who possess some reduced
degree of criminal culpability seems problematic.... [N] evertheless
[the plaintiff's] conviction, despite its misleading label, contem-
plates complete criminal responsibility for the killings."22 Other
courts have articulated an even more unforgiving construct,
emphasizing that the "determination is an objective inquiry."'
There is also some uncertainty as to whether the doctrine is
limited to misconduct that violates criminal statutes, or might also
include serious "immoral" acts. The vast majority of cases applying
the doctrine have involved the former. But, a number of cases, in
articulating the serious misconduct bar, couch the rule in broader
118. Rimert v. Mortell, 680 N.E.2d 867, 874 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). Some courts have held
that the bar would not apply if the person injured while committing the wrongful act was of
unsound mind. Wackwitz v. Roy, 418 S.E.2d 861, 864-65 (Va. 1992) (refusing to apply
doctrine where the decedent was of unsound mind when he committed suicide); see also
Molchon v. Tyler, 546 S.E.2d 691, 695 (Va. 2001).
119. 680 N.E.2d 867 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
120. Id. at 869.
121. Id. at 875.
122. Id.
123. Lee v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 497 S.E.2d 328, 330 (Va. 1998) (applying the serious
misconduct bar to a thirteen-year-old plaintiff). The court may have softened its rule
somewhat, however, by stating that the plaintiff must have been engaged in the illegal
conduct voluntarily and that whether he did so may depend on his "maturity, intelligence,
and mental capacity." Id.
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terms of an illegal or immoral act. 4 The lack of clear objective
guidelines is, of course, part of the problem with the doctrine.
2. Risk Restriction
Some cases have suggested restrictions on the scope of the
serious misconduct bar based on variations of a risk analysis. In
Rosenick v. Cham,"1 while approving the serious misconduct rule
in principle, the court refused to apply it if the plaintiff's cause of
action "can be established without relying on his illegal act." 6 The
plaintiff alleged that the defendant-physician, during the course of
providing psychiatric counseling, engaged in sexual relations with
the plaintiff and exploited the therapist-patient relationship.1
27
Specifically, the court held that "[blecause plaintiff can establish
her claim for medical malpractice ... without relying on her
adultery, that adultery arguably is not causally connected but
rather is 'merely incidentally or collaterally connected' to plaintiff's
claim, thereby precluding the application of the wrongful-conduct
rule. "'2B In a similar vein, Justice Kennedy of the Alabama Supreme
Court, writing separately in the Oden2 9 case, suggested that the
bar should apply only if the plaintiffs loss could not have occurred
unless plaintiff's acts were criminal in nature. 30 In other words, he
suggested that the doctrine may operate only when "an essential
part of the claim"'3 ' was the illegal act. Accordingly, in the instant
case where a vending machine fell on the victim when he was tilting
124. Oden v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., 621 So.2d 953, 954 (Ala. 1993); Cole v. Taylor, 301
N.W.2d 766,768 (Iowa 1981) (barring a claim against a psychiatrist for allegedly negligently
failing to prevent plaintifffrom committing murder); Wackwitz v. Roy, 418 S.E.2d 861,864
(Va. 1992) (recognizing in principle the rule that recovery may be barred for harm to one
injured while engaged in an "immoral or unlawful act," but refusing to apply it if the
decedent was of unsound mind when he committed suicide).
125. No. 214298, 2001 WL 776737 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2001).
126. Id. at *2.
127. Id. at *1.
128. Id. at *3 (quoting Orzel v. Scott Drug Co., 537 N.W.2d 208, 215 (Mich. 1995)). The
court also noted that the plaintiffs "adultery does not relieve defendant of his greater
culpability because the adulterous relationship occurred within the context ofthe physician-
patient relationship." Id. at *4.
129. Oden, 621 So.2d at 955 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
130. Id. at 956-57.
131. Id. at 957.
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it in an attempt to steal, Justice Kennedy would have preferred not
to have applied the bar because a youth could have been similarly
harmed while tilting the machine for noncriminal reasons.' 2 What
Justice Kennedy seems to mean here is that the criminal aspect
must have been an essential ingredient of the dynamic that
engendered the injury. Other courts that have adopted the bar have
fashioned a similar limitation. 133
132. See id.
133. Mischalski v. Ford Motor Co., 935 F. Supp. 203 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (applying New York
law); Poch v. Anderson, 580 N.W.2d 456 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998). In Poch, the plaintiff-
passenger allegedly illegally provided the defendant-minor-driver with alcohol, and a wreck
ensued. Id. at 457-58. The defendant asserted, inter alia, a wrongful conduct defense. Id. at
458-59. The court approved the serious misconduct bar in principle, but held that it did not
apply in the instant case. Id. The court said that there must be a "sufficient causal nexus"
between plaintiffs illegal conduct and the harm. Id. at 458. Elaborating, the court explained
that if the cause of action could be shown independent of establishing the plaintiffs illegal
act, then the plaintiffs violation would be deemed incidental and not a bar. Id. at 460. Thus,
the court seemed to contemplate a test wherein the bar would depend on whether the
plaintiff has to "prove his violation of the statute to fully plead his cause of action." Id. In
other words, it depended on whether this exact type of accident could have happened even
if the plaintiff had not broken the law. Id.
In the Mischalski case, the plaintiff was injured when a car jack collapsed while he was
servicing a car. Mischalski, 935 F. Supp. at 203. The plaintiff sued Ford, the car
manufacturer. Id. at 204. Ford then contended that plaintiff's claim was barred because he
was an illegal alien engaged in unlicensed employment, and also that he was working "off
the books" on his own time. Id. at 205. The court approved the defense in principle, but found
it inapplicable here, holding that "mere commission of an offense ... does not bar a plaintiff."
Id. at 206. Rather, the bar maybe applied only when the plaintiffs own criminal conduct was
a"contributing proximate cause" of his or her injuries. Id. (citation omitted). The court stated
that
even assuming for the sake of argument ... that plaintiff may have been
working illegally, either because he was an illegal alien or because he was
receiving money offthe books and thus was not paying taxes on that income [an
assumption for which there was no evidence], ... [that would] not cause the
work to be dangerous and was not a proximate ... cause of plaintiffs injuries.
Id.
Ford attempted to satisfy the proximate cause requirement with the following gambit:
plaintiffs employer had hydraulic lifts that were routinely used to conduct air suspension
repairs, but since plaintiff was working off the books on his own time, he used the car's tire
jack instead, and that decision caused his injury. Id. at 205. The court rejected this
argument, noting that plaintiffs method of changing the car's air suspension pillow should
be addressed under comparative negligence principles. Id. at 206. What the court seems to
mean is that what made the plaintiffs conduct allegedly illegal was not the fact of using a
tire jack (people do that all the time), but the alleged efforts to avoid paying income tax. But,
tax avoidance strategies are not statistically associated with crushing injuries. See generally
Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr.,
43 U. CmI. L. REV. 69 (1975) (discussing proximate cause).
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Some courts have incorporated a risk-based limitation in the
serious misconduct bar even more explicitly. In Ardinger v.
Hummell, s4 the court held that a precondition for the serious
misconduct bar was that the harm must have been a
materialization of a risk the criminal statute was designed to
prevent.'85 In Ardinger, the defendant-minor was sued for allegedly
entrusting her mother's car to the decedent-driver, who was
killed. 6 The defendant asserted a defense based on decedent-
driver's alleged violation of a statute forbidding the operation of a
car without the permission of the owner.'3 7 Relying, inter alia, 3 8 on
the above risk analysis, the court held that the harm suffered did
not result from the type of risk the statute was designed to prevent,
namely the prevention of theft and consequent damage to
property.
3 9
It appears that a proximate cause type of limitation on the
serious misconduct bar has been a part (albeit an often ill-defined
part) of the doctrine from its early evolution." A more sensible
approach would have been to eschew the serious misconduct bar
134. 982 P.2d 727, 735 (Alaska 1999).
135. Id. at 735-36; see also Orzel v. Scott Drug Co., 537 N.W.2d 208 (Mich. 1995). In Orzel,
the plaintiff sued several defendants, alleging that they negligently supplied him with
methamphetamines resulting in his addiction. Id. at 210. The defendant that remained at
the time of trial argued that the plaintiffs illegal conduct, obtaining and using
methamphetamine without avalidprescription in violation ofthe Controlled Substances Act,
supported application of the "wrongful-conduct rule." Id. at 213-14. The court seemed to
adopt a proximate cause limitation to the doctrine, stating that the plaintiffs illegal conduct
must have been a "direct, immediate, and necessarily proximate cause of his addiction." Id.
at 216. In holding that the plaintiffs criminal conduct was a proximate cause of his addiction,
the court's rationale seemed to be based on a risk analysis whereby it found that addiction
was a materialization ofa risk of illegal access to prescription drugs. The court distinguished
a situation in which the plaintiff, while allegedly engaged in an illegal bingo game, had fallen
into a hole on the premises where the game was played and sued the owner. Id. at 216. In
that type of situation, the bar would not apply because, as the court explained, there the
bingo game "merely served as an occasion for the injury." Id. at 217. What the court seems
to mean here is that the slip and fall was not part of the reason why it is illegal to play bingo,
but addiction is part of the risk in illegal prescriptions.
136. Ardinger, 982 P.2d at 729.
137. Id. at 730.
138. The court also held that the criminal conduct in question did not rise to the level of
seriousness required under the serious misconduct bar. Id. at 736.
139. Id. at 736-37.
140. Davis, supra note 35, at 513 (contending that the rule should apply only when the
illegal act is "the immediate, active cause" of the harm, rather than "simply a remote link in
the chain of causation").
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altogether. Rather than fussing with essentially two proximate
cause inquiries-one that asks whether the serious violation by the
plaintiff was a proximate cause, and also whether the defendant's
negligence was a proximate cause-why not broadly and simply ask
whether the harm in question was a proximate result of the
defendant's tortious conductm--a materialization of a risk that
rendered the defendant's conduct unreasonable?
3. Other Prerequisites
A variety of other limitations on the serious misconduct bar
occasionally have been suggested. A few courts may require
"joint involvement by the plaintiff and the defendant in the
wrongdoing," "' or at least express more comfort with the doctrine
in that type of situation.4 3 Although many of the cases applying the
serious misconduct bar do involve situations in which the plaintiff
and defendant both participated in the illegal conduct, that is
seldom said to be a precondition to the bar if otherwise applicable,
and many cases have applied the bar in situations in which the
141. Indeed, some commentators have noted the similarity between the serious
misconduct bar and a proximate cause analysis. DOBBS, supra note 15, at 527.
142. MacDougall, supra note 5, at 25.
143. See Stinger v. Iskander, 28 Va. Cir. 496 (1992). See generally Lee v. Nationwide Mut
Ins. Co., 497 S.E.2d 328, 329 (Va. 1998) (stating that the "illegality defense is based on the
principle that a party who consents to and participates in an illegal act may not recover from
[the] other participants for the consequences of that act"). In Stinger, the decedent died in
jail after having previously consumed illegal drugs. Stinger, 28 Va. Cir. at 496. A wrongful
death action was brought alleging malpractice in treatment while in jail (presumably
treatment in connection with the decedents ingestion of drugs). Id. at 496-97. In refusing to
grant summary judgment for the defendant, the court distinguished some of the serious
misconduct cases relied on by the defendants because they involved claims against a
"partner-in-crime." Id. at 500.
Notwithstanding the "partner-in-crime" focus of these cases, other cases in the same
jurisdiction have applied the bar beyond the partner-in-crime setting, at least in some types
of situations. See Adkins v. Dixon, 482 S.E.2d 797 (Va. 1997). InAdkins, a client brought a
legal malpractice claim, alleging negligent failure of counsel to raise the speedy trial issue
with respect to six criminal charges for which the jury ultimately found the plaintiff guilty
and for which it recommended two life sentences plus forty-five years. Id. at 798-99. The
court held that the defendant-attorney was entitled to a judgment on various grounds,
including a requirement that the plaintiffmust allege his actual innocence of the six charges.
Id. at 800-01. The court specifically relied on the traditional ground for the serious
misconduct bar that "courts will not assist the participant in an illegal act who seeks to profit
from the act's commission." Id. at 801 (quoting Zysk v. Zysk, 404 S.E.2d 721, 722 (Va. 1990)).
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defendant was not a partner-in-crime.144 Some cases have held that
the doctrine is not applicable if the plaintiff's right to recover in the
circumstances is explicitly authorized by statute. 145
D. Putative Rationales for the Doctrine
A stale smorgasbord of rationales has been offered to explain the
serious misconduct bar. Some have been more prevalent in selected
contexts than others.
1. May Not Profit
Perhaps the most common justification posited for the serious
misconduct bar, actually more of a mantra, is that the doctrine
prevents the wrongdoer from "profiting" from his misconduct. A
typical statement of this idea is that the "policy derives from the
rule that one may not profit from one's own wrongdoing." 146
Numerous cases have invoked this rationale." 7 It derives from the
144. E.g., Guadamud v. Dentply Intl, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 433 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (applying
New York law); Oden v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., 621 So.2d 953 (Ala. 1993); Feltner v. Casey
Family Program, 902 P.2d 206 (Wyo. 1995).
145. Poch v. Anderson, 580 N.W.2d 456,458 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998); see also Orzel v. Scott
Drug Co., 537 N.W.2d 208, 219 (Mich. 1995) (suggesting that the doctrine will not apply if
the plaintiffs injury arose out of conduct by the defendant that also violated a statutory
prohibition, and either the statute expressly authorized a damages remedy by injured
persons similarly situated to the plaintiff, or the plaintiff "clearly" fell within the class of
persons the allegedly violated statutes were designed to protect).
146. Manning v. Brown, 689 N.E.2d 1382, 1384 (N.Y. 1997).
147. E.g., Wiley v. County of San Diego, 966 P.2d 983, 986-87 (Cal. 1998) (stating, in a
legal malpractice context, that a criminal should not profit from his own wrong); Rowe v.
Schreiber, 725 So.2d 1245, 1251 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (stating, in legal malpractice
context, that unless the plaintiff were in fact innocent, allowing recovery could indirectly
reward the wrongdoer for his crime); Rimert v. Motrell, 680 N.E.2d 867, 874 (Ind. Ct. App.
1997) (stating that rule was at least "correlative with" state's "public policy against
permitting one to profit from his or her wrongdoing"); Ray v. Stone, 952 S.W.2d 220,224 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1997) (noting, in legal malpractice context, that rule is based on the "public policy
that prohibits financial gain resulting directly or indirectly, from criminal acts"); Orzel, 537
N.W.2d at 213 (stating that otherwise wrongdoers would profit or receive compensation as
a result of their illegal acts); Cork v. St. Charles County, 10 S.W.3d 608, 609 (Mo. Ct. App.
2000) (stating as a "fundamental maxim of the common law" that a person should not be
permitted to "take advantage of his own wrong"); Mahoney v. Shaheen, Cappiello, Stein &
Gordon, 727 A.2d 996,999 (N.H. 1999) (stating, in legal malpractice context, that "it is wrong
to allow a guilty defendant to profit from criminal behavior"); Barker v. Kallash, 468 N.E.2d
39,43 (N.Y. 1984) (stating that wrongdoer may not profit from own wrongdoing); Symone T.
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"principle, of greater generality, its roots deeply fastened in
universal sentiments of justice, the principle that no man should
profit from ... his own wrong."148
The "may not profit" rationale is conclusory and unconvincing.
We are not told why no one may so "profit," nor why the "social
interest"149 served by this principle outweighs other interests
advanced by allowing a remedy. It all tediously seem to beg the
question: If a plaintiff in a tort case is simply entitled to be made
whole by the award of compensatory damages, where is the
"profit"?50 As Justice Ingram noted with respect to a fourteen-year-
old crushed to death trying to tilt a soda machine, the victim is not
going to "profit" from his lawsuit.'51
2. Deterrence and Moral Hazard
Some courts have reasoned that the bar serves a deterrent
purpose, sending a signal that the law must be obeyed.'52 Thus, one
court stated that to allow recovery would "condone and encourage
illegal conduct." 5 ' Some authorities have simply said that the
v. Lieber, 613 N.Y.S.2d 404, 405 (App. Div. 1994) (stating that "[tihe policy has its roots in
the rule that one may not profit from one's own wrongdoing"); Peeler v. Hughes & Luce, 909
S.W.2d 494, 497 (Tex. 1995) (referring, in legal malpractice context, to the public policy
against allowing criminals to profit from their illegal acts); Zysk v. Zysk, 404 S.E.2d 721,722
(Va. 1990) (stating that rule is "premised on the idea that courts will not assist the
participant in an illegal act who seeks to profit from the act's commission"); Gail D. Hollister,
Tort Suits for Injuries Sustained During Illegal Abortions: The Effects of Judicial Bias, 45
VILL. L. REv. 387, 391 (2000); Prentice, supra note 5, at 106.
148. BENJAmwI N. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDIcIAL PRocEss 41 (1921).
149. Id. at 43.
150. The dictionary definition of "profit" is a "valuable return" or "the excess of returns
over expenditure." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 931 (10th ed. 1993). See
also Hollister, supra note 147, at 447 (reasoning that the plaintiffs are not seeking "profit,"
but compensation); Prentice, supra note 5, at 110 (saying that plaintiffs do not "profit" when
they are merely compensated with traditional tort remedies in personal injury litigation).
Prentice argues that the doctrine should operate only to the extent necessary to prevent
recovery for lost expectations ofgain directly from the misconduct in question, and to prevent
punitive damages (which are extra profit). Id. at 107-08.
151. See Oden v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., 621 So.2d 953, 959-61 (Ala. 1993) (Ingram, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
152. Barker, 468 N.E.2d at 43.
153. Orzel v. Scott Drug Co., 537 N.W.2d 208, 213 (Mich. 1995); see also Wiley v. County
of San Diego, 966 P.2d 983, 986 (Cal. 1998) (stating, in a legal malpractice context, that
unless the plaintiffwere in fact innocent, allowing recovery by the person who committed the
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doctrine operates "in the nature of a punishment for the plaintiffs
wrongdoing."' These rationales seem concerned with the moral
hazard'55 potdntial of allowing those engaging in serious
wrongdoing to recover damages from tortfeasors who may also have
causally contributed to the victim's injury.
There are several problems with the punishment-deterrent
rationales. First, one would assume that most persons engaging in
criminal conduct do not expect to be injured in the process, at least
not by negligence, and therefore would seldom be influenced by the
thought of being barred from suing. Certainly, that would seem true
in the case of minors acting impulsively. Second, if there is an
apparent risk of injury, why is that not deterrent enough? Third, as
a general matter, one might question how much a possible bar from
tort recovery adds, at the margins, to the deterrence already in
place in the form of potential criminal sanctions.' Fourth, the
doctrine's unpredictableness undermines its deterrent effect.' 5
Fifth, few career criminals would be aware of the tort bar. 5 ' Sixth,
how much deterrence does the serious misconduct bar add to the
deterrence that inheres in some situations, such as those involving
illegal abortions, with financial costs, psychological impact, and
crime would shift responsibility from the criminal, diminish consequences of the criminal
conduct, and undermine the system of criminal justice) (citingPeelerv. Hughes &Luce, 909
S.W.2d 494, 498 (Tex. 1995)); Zysk v. Zysk, 404 S.E.2d 721, 722 (Va. 1990) (saying that a
contrary rule would "encourage plaintiffs to engage in or permit criminal conduct, for they
would know that recovery is possible if harm results"); Greene v. Guarino, 25 Va. Cir. 162,
163 (1991) (stating that the rule is in the nature of punishment, but declining to apply it to
the facts of the instant case); Hollister, supra note 147, at 391-92 (noting the rationale that
preventing recovery in such situations deters illegal conduct).
154. Davis, supra note 35, at 513.
155. For background on the notion of moral hazard, see Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty
and the Welfare Economics ofMedical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941,961 (1963) (defining one
element of moral hazard as "the effect of insurance on incentives"); Tom Baker, On the
Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237,239 (1996) (referring to the "tendency for
insurance against loss to reduce incentives to prevent or minimize the cost of loss"); George
L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297, 1313-14 (1981).
156. See generally Gail D. Hollister, Using Comparative Fault to Replace the All-or.
Nothing Lottery Imposed in Intentional Torts Suits in Which Both Plaintiff and Defendant
Are at Fault, '46 VAND. L. REV. 121 (1993).
157. MacDougall, supra note 5, at 37. The way various courts treat injuries to children
allegedly experimentingwith "pipe bombs" illustrates this unpredictableness. See infra notes
281-84 and accompanying text.
158. Hollister, supra note 147, at 393 (noting that women seeking illegal abortions, for
example, would be even less likely to be aware of the doctrine).
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stigma? 59 And finally, given the reciprocal nature of defenses, any
dilution of the deterrence of plaintiffs from repudiating the serious
misconduct bar would be offset by the additioial deterrence of
defendants that would pari passu flow from the added potential
liability.1
60
In general, the assumptions underlying the whole dynamic of
moral hazard may be exaggerated. Some commentators have noted
that money may well not compensate for many losses.'6 ' Moreover,
victims are often less in control of forces than defendant-tortfeasors,
and therefore in less of an effective position to prevent accidents. 1
62
Also, some question whether moral hazard really increases risky
behavior, considering its complexity and the fact that its
relationship to accidents is unknown."' Also, inordinate concern
with moral hazard may ignore "positive externalities" of the
benefits that insurance arrangements (and, for present purposes,
tort recoveries) provide "to parties who are not directly involved in
the insurance relationship."' 6 ' Finally, Professor Baker asks
rhetorically: "Is insurance only, or mostly, for the 'moral,' and who
are they?" 16
5
3. Appearances
One will often find a concern over public reaction tucked away in
discussions of the serious misconduct bar. Allowing tort recovery by
one injured in the course of serious misconduct might cause the
public to "view the legal system as a mockery of justice," 66 and
"would indeed shock the public conscience, engender disrespect for
159. See id. at 394.
160. Prentice, supra note 5, at 110-13.
161. Baker, supra note 155, at 276. Moreover, the benefit to defendant-tortfeasors of
barring liability is more fully realized and thus "may well present a greater moral hazard...
than does" liability benefits to the victims. Id. at 279.
162. Id. at 280.
163. Id. at 288.
164. Id. at 289. Baker elaborates, saying that "fulnless and until economic theory can
bring these public goods into the moral hazard equation, the economics of moral hazard will
systematically understate the benefits of social responsibility, overstate the costs, and, in the
process, provide unwarranted support for the current legal and political flight from
responsibility." Id.
165. Id. at 292.
166. Orzel v. Scott Drug Co., 537 N.W.2d 208, 213 (Mich. 1995).
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courts and generally discredit the administration of justice."167 As
Justice Brandeis remarked in another context:
The governing principle ... is that a court will not redress a
wrong when he who invokes its aid has unclean hands.... The
court's aid is denied ... when [the plaintiff] has violated the law
in connection with the very transaction as to which he seeks
legal redress. Then aid is denied despite the defendant's wrong.
It is denied in order to maintain respect for law; in order to
promote confidence in the administration of justice; in order to
preserve the judicial process from contamination. 6 '
Unlike some of the other rationales, this one occasionally may be at
least operatively accurate in some respects in the sense that
allowing recovery may attract the attention of the press and cause
public dismay. That does not mean, however, that the possibility of
such a public reaction is sufficient to justify the doctrine.
There are two intertwined conceits underlying this rationale. One
is that compensating vile criminals for injuries arising out of their
misconduct might elicit a negative public reaction. It would be
"unseemly."'69 The response here is that we do it all the time. Many
lawsuits are pursued by undeserving, sometimes even fraudulent
plaintiffs. The difference here is that conduct perceived as involving
serious misconduct is more visible. Even so, the benefit of avoiding
167. Wileyv. County ofSan Diego, 966 P.2d 983, 986 (Cal. 1998) (quotingPeelerv. Hughes
&Luce, 909 S.W.2d 494,497 (Tex. 1995)) (stating, in the context of legal malpractice claims,
that unless the plaintiff were in fact innocent, allowing recovery by the personwho
committed the crime would shock the public conscience and discredit the system of justice);
see also Mahoney v. Shaheen, Cappiello, Stein & Gordon, 727 A.2d 996,999-1000 (N.H. 1999)
(stating, in the context of legal malpractice claims, that unless the plaintiff were in fact
innocent, allowing recovery by the person who committed the crime would shock the public
conscience and cause disrespect to the system of justice, and that the rule "prevents the
perversion of our public policy"); Peeler, 909 S.W.2d at 497 (stating, in the context of legal
malpractice claims, that allowing recovery by the person who committed the crime would be
shocking to the public, causing disrespectfor and discrediting the system ofjustice); Balboni,
supra note 42, at 395 (expressing concern over the reaction of members of the public if
plaintiffs recovered damages); Davis, supra note 35, at 517-18 (noting that the doctrine was
needed because otherwise it would be "unseemly that a person should appeal to the law for
redress for an injury caused directly by his own unlawful act, and only remotely by other
circumstances").
168. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 483-84 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
169. Davis, supra note 35, at 517.
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negative public reaction hardly justifies a doctrine that is so
subjective and prone to abuse.
The other dimension to this rationale is more insidious. It seems
based on a fear that somehow the evil characteristic that produced
the misconduct could rub off on the court or judicial system and
contaminate them. The hope is that the bar helps to preserve the
integrity of the courts. i 0 There are several problems with this
speculation. First, this rationale ignores the countervailing
contamination potential when the bar operates to confer immunity
on an equally bad tortfeasor.17 ' Also, judges and juries deal with
reprehensible conduct every day.1 2 Secondly, an established
mechanism is already in place, in the form of comparative fault, to
address the relative fault of the parties and make appropriate
adjustments to the plaintiffs redress to reflect that fault calculus.
As one commentator observed, "the moral characteristics of the
parties before a court have little or no relevance to that court's
capacity to do justice or injustice." 173
4. Nonreciprocal Riskiness
Occasionally, the serious misconduct bar, or a distorted
proximate-cause surrogate for it, has been explained in terms of a
fairness rationale. Essentially, it may be unfair, under this
rationale, to subject a defendant to potential liability when the
plaintiffs fault went way beyond the level of risk to which the
defendant would ever subject himself."' Thus, where the plaintiff
engages in a nonreciprocal level of self-regarding riskiness, way
beyond that in which the defendant engages, the defendant should
not have to underwrite the consequences of this outlier conduct.
170. Hollister, supra note 147, at 392, 396; Prentice, supra note 5, at 119-20.
171. Hollister, supra note 147, at 396; Prentice, supra note 5, at 119-20.
172. MacDougall, supra note 5, at 36.
173. Prentice, supra note 5, at 122.
174. Cf. Christopher Dove, Note, Dumb as a Matter of Law: The "Superseding Cause"
Modification of Comparative Negligence, 79 TEX. L. REV. 493, 510 (2000) (explaining the
tendency of some courts to deny relief on proximate cause grounds to some extremely
negligent plaintiffs-rather than simply allowing their fault to be addressed under a
comparative fault analysis-as based on the fact that courts do not like "requiring reasonable
people to plan for the actions of others that they would never do themselves").
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In some cases, the plaintiff's conduct may be so unforeseeable
that perhaps the defendant should prevail on proximate cause
grounds.75 However, that outcome really would be based on
proximate cause, one of the traditional elements needed to support
recovery, rather than the serious misconduct bar. The problem with
a rationale based on the variation of the Golden Rule for the "really
dumb plaintiff" is that, unless it can be said that the plaintiff's
conduct truly was not a part of the risk calculus that rendered the
defendant negligent, the fault of the plaintiff should be addressed
by comparative fault.
5. Common Sense or "Trust Me"
Proponents groping for a rationale for the serious misconduct
doctrine occasionally invoke what I call the "common sense" or
"trust me" rationale. Thus, one commentator writes that "common
sense dictates criminals and wrongdoers should be prohibited from
taking advantage of the court system to further a criminal
scheme."17 Or, consider the language of the Iowa Supreme Court,
stating that allowing a person to recover from her psychiatrist for
alleged negligence in failing to prevent her from murdering her
former husband "would be, plainly and simply, wrong as a matter
of public policy." 77
Perhaps what we have here is simply an expression of frustration
with the task of reconciling in a convincing way the serious
misconduct bar with core elements and goals of tort law. It reminds
me of Judge Friendly's apologia in the Kinsman'8 case reacting to
the impenetrable nature of proximate cause. There he stated that
the many efforts to define the rule "are not very promising,"'79 and
in the end "what courts do in such cases makes better sense than
what they, or others, say."8 0 Friendly's candor was a more
forthright admission than the less-introspective language of some
175. See infra notes 238-48 and accompanying text.
176. Balboni, supra note 42, at 393.
177. Cole v. Taylor, 301 N.W.2d 766, 768 (Iowa 1981).
178. Petition of the Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964) (applying New York
law).
179. Id. at 725.
180. Id.
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of the courts seeking to justify the serious misconduct doctrine. The
facile words of the courts are no less satisfactory despite their
confident, reassuring tone. Not only do they fail to provide a
thoughtful foundation to guide the application of the rule, but they
may mask the underlying personal predilections of the courts. As
Albert Camus observed, "[tihe regularity of an impulse or a
repulsion in a soul is encountered again in habits of doing or
thinking, [and] is reproduced in consequences of which the soul
itself knows nothing."1"'
6. Moral Responsibility
Some rationales for the serious misconduct bar focus on
individual responsibility, and exude a distinct moral tone.8 2 These
bad plaintiffs made their bed; let them lie in it. Thus, the Supreme
Court of Alabama has reasoned that barringthese claims "promotes
the desirable public policy objective of preventing those ...
engag[ing] in an illegal or immoral act involving moral turpitude
from imposing liability in others for the consequences of their own
behavior."'83 Numerous other courts have expressed a similar
concern about allowing serious wrongdoers to shift responsibility to
run-of-the-mill tortfeasors.
8 4
181. ALBERT CAMUS, THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS 8 (Justin O'Brien trans., Random House
1960) (1955).
182. See Barker v. Kallash, 468 N.E.2d 39, 44-45 (N.Y. 1984) (Jasen, J., concurring)
(writing separately to offer "boundaries" for the rule, and saying that the rule applies to
"wrongdoing that is morally reprehensible, heinous, or gravely injurious to the public
interests"); Prentice, supra note 5, at 82 (noting that "a tone of strong moral outrage
permeates many of the cases").
183. Oden v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., 621 So.2d 953, 955 (Ala. 1993).
184. E.g., Wiley v. County of San Diego, 966 P.2d 983, 986 (Cal. 1998) (stating, in the
context of a legal malpractice case, that unless the plaintiff were in fact innocent, allowing
recovery would shift responsibility from the criminal); Rimertv. Mortell, 680N.E.2d 867,873
(Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (stating that the rule was based on the "sound public policy that
convicted criminals should not be permitted to impose or shift liability for the consequences
of their own antisocial conduct"); Orzel v. Scott Drug Co., 537 N.W.2d 208, 213 (Mich. 1995)
(reasoning that without the rule, wrongdoers could thereby shift much of their responsibility
to others); Mahoney v. Shaheen, Cappiello, Stein & Gordon, 727 A.2d 996, 999 (N.H. 1999)
(stating, in the context of a legal malpractice case, that unless the plaintiff were in fact
innocent, allowing recovery "would likely shift the responsibility for the criminal conduct and
its associated consequences awayfrom the defendant"); Peelerv. Hughes & Luce, 909 S.W.2d
494, 498 (Tex. 1995) (stating, in the context of a legal malpractice case, that "allowing civil
recovery for convicts impermissibly shifts responsibility for the crime away from the
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Moral overlays like this one have not been so vivid in tort
doctrine since the heyday of exclusively fault-based tort law. The
problem is that moral offensiveness is a patently subjective notion.
We should be careful before committing these kinds of morality-
based judgments exclusively to the discretion of judges and to the
exclusion of juries, who would otherwise address such matters in
the context of comparative fault. How do we measure the
immorality where, for example, a fourteen-year-old boy is crushed
to death when a soft drink vending machine falls on him while he
was tilting it?..5 Are we so confident of his immorality that we
should ignore the entire spectrum of forces that contributed to his
death?
7. Not Proper Role for Judicial Branch
A number of courts have suggested that compensating victims
whose harm arose in part from their own acts of serious misconduct
is not a proper role for the courts. The leading case of Barker v.
Kallash8 6 stated that "courts should not lend assistance to one who
seeks compensation under the law for injuries resulting from his
own acts when they involve a substantial violation of the law."'
This argument, of course, begs the question. Whether it is an
appropriate role for the courts depends on the goals of tort law and
the role of the courts in achieving those goals.
8. Unforseeability and Risk Analysis
Some courts suggest that harm suffered in the course of a
victim's serious misconduct may not be foreseeable, 88 or at least
not a part of the risk the materialization of which renders the
convict7).
185. Oden, 621 So.2d at 953.
186. 468 N.E.2d 39 (N.Y. 1984).
187. Id. at 43; see also Oden, 621 So.2d at 955 (observing that by barring such claims, we
help to assure "that those who transgress the moral or criminal code shall not receive aid
from the judicial branch of government'V") (quoting Bonnier v. Chicago B & Q R.R., 113
N.E.2d 615,622 (l. 1953)).
188. Oden, 621 So.2d at 959-60 (Ingram, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(identifying and criticizing, in the instant case, the unforeseeability argument).
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defendant's conduct negligent.' 9 One court, for example, articulated
the risk rationale in the context of a legal malpractice claim against
the plaintiffs criminal defense counsel. In holding that the plaintiff
must prove that he was actually innocent of the criminal conduct
charged, the court said that "constitutional protections are to
safeguard against conviction of the wrongly accused and to
vindicate fundamental values [, but] are not intended to confer any
direct benefit outside the context of the criminal justice system." °90
There are several difficulties with the foreseeability-risk
rationale. First, if foreseeability means anything, one could
question whether, for example, in the Oden case, it really was
unforeseeable that a teenager might tilt a vending machine,19' or in
Wiley, whether the risk of losing one's constitutionally guaranteed
protections was not contemplated within the duty owed by a lawyer
to his client.' 92 Second, a foreseeability-risk analysis is the
quintessential grist for the proximate cause element rather than
some ill-defined outlier doctrine like the serious misconduct bar.
Finally, issues of foreseeability are usually matters for the jury
rather than the trial judge.'93
9. Response to Comparative Fault
One of the most telling criticisms of the serious misconduct bar
is that it constitutes an unwarranted and ill-defined circumvention
of the established comparative fault system for allocating damages
among the parties based on their relative fault in contributing to
the injury. Thus, it is peculiar that this very aspect of the doctrine
is occasionally proffered as a justification for it. In the leading
Barker case, for example, the court comments that the serious
misconduct bar might be needed as a tool to respond to the
comparative fault system in order to prevent the "pendulum" 94
189. Id. at 959; Wiley, 966 P.2d at 983 (discussing the doctrine in the context of a legal
malpractice case based on the defense of a criminal prosecution).
190. Wiley, 966 P.2d at 988-89.
191. See Oden, 621 So.2d at 959 (Ingram, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(identifying and criticizing, in the instant case, the unforeseeability argument).
192. Wiley, 966 P.2d at 983.
193. DOBBS, supra note 15, at 447, 449-50.
194. Barker v. Kallash, 468 N.E.2d 39, 44 (N.Y. 1984).
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from swinging too far "by going to opposite extremes in the
future."195
As an unintended consequence, comparative fault statutes may
actually have breathed new life into the serious misconduct bar by
offering the courts a handy prop for occasionally ignoring
comparative fault rules and simply barring the plaintiffs case.
That, of course, represents a selective, ad hoc, and frequently
arbitrary subversion of the established system. It also constitutes
an encroachment on the traditional prerogatives of the jury.
10. Undeserving Miscreants
Courts occasionally use language that harkens back to the
"outlaw" roots of the serious misconduct rule. Thus, in the seminal
Barker case, the court says that the plaintiff had no cause of action
"cognizable at law."196 The implication here is that plaintiffs barred
by the serious misconduct doctrine were deemed outlaws whose
interests were therefore outside the remedial ambit of legal
beneficence.
This kind of classificatory exclusion of persons from the system
of torts remedies is subject to the same objections as other similar
exclusions. Thus, for example, those deemed to be unworthy poor
have been excluded from the welfare system, and the so-called libel-
proof plaintiffs have sometimes been denied defamation
recoveries. 19' Facially deeming persons unworthy may assuage the
sensitivities of decision makers by masking the underlying societal
dynamic that engendered the conduct that offends the courts. But,
we are no closer to solutions.
11. Participant Consent
Some cases applying the serious misconduct rule involve
situations in which the plaintiff and defendant were both willing
participants in the illegal activity. In this type of situation, courts
sometimes rationalize the rule with some form of a consent
195. Id.
196. Id. at 43.
197. King, supra note 25, at 394-99.
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argument. In Lee v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,198 the
thirteen-year-old plaintiffwas riding with a sixteen-year-old driver
who, along with the daughter of the car's owner, allegedly borrowed
the car without the owner's consent. In holding that recovery was
barred, the court stated that "[t]he illegality defense is based on the
principle that a party who consents to and participates in afi illegal
act may not recover from other participants for the consequences of
that act."199 And in Zysk v. Zysk,2"' the plaintiff alleged that shortly
before her marriage to the defendant, she and the defendant had
engaged in consensual sexual intercourse and as a result she was
infected with herpes simplex virus. The Supreme Court of Virginia
held that since the plaintiff was participating in the crime of
fornication, she was barred from tort recovery.20 '
The consent argument, however, makes no sense here. The
plaintiff in Lee did not consent to the defendant driving negligently,
nor did the unsuspecting plaintiff inZysk consent to contracting the
herpes virus. As Professor Dobbs explains in another context,
"[clonsent to an illegal abortion ... is not consent to negligent
infliction of harm or death."20 2 The court in Zysk even notes that
the serious misconduct bar is "not an assumption-of-the-risk
concept,"20 3 and therefore may apply "even though defendant
concealed his infection from the plaintiff."204 Thus, the question of
198. 497 S.E.2d 328 (Va. 1998).
199. Id. at 329; see also Zysk v. Zysk, 404 S.E.2d 721,722 (Va. 1990) (stating that since the
plaintiff was engaging in crime of fornication, she was barred under the "general rule" that
a party who consents and participates in an immoral or illegal act cannot recover damages
from other participants, and that the bar was "premised on the idea that courts will not
assist the participant in an illegal act who seeks to profit from the act's commission").
200. 404 S.E.2d at 721.
201. Id.
202. DOBBS, supra note 15, at 246 (discussing the question of whether the fact that a
plaintiff consents to criminal conduct should invalidate the plaintiffs consent, and noting
that irrespective of the answer to that question, the "consent" should not bar a claim on
consent grounds for harm beyond the scope of that consent); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 892C cmt. c (1979) (stating that the plaintiffs consent to engage in criminal
conduct does not preclude liability if either the defendant exceeds the scope of consent or the
defendant acts negligently); id. illus. 6 (stating that while otherwise valid consent might bar
a battery claim for an illegal abortion, it would not bar a claim for negligence if the defendant
negligently failed to sterilize his instruments).
203. Zysk, 404 S.E.2d at 722.
204. Id. If an implied assumption-of-risk analysis were to apply here, it would be
addressed by traditional rules governing the assumption of risk defense or (as more likely)
be subsumed into comparative fault, or occasionally be addressed under traditional elements
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whether the particular plaintiff's actions should, on the grounds of
consent, bar the plaintiffs claim ought to depend on the validity
and scope of the supposed consent as such. And, the question of
whether the serious misconduct doctrine should bar a claim should
depend on the standing and scope of that doctrine.
12. Stealth Comparative Fault
Some cases try to explain the serious misconduct bar on the basis
of the disparate relative fault of the parties. Thus for example, in
the context of a malpractice claim against a criminal defense
attorney, one court reasoned that if the plaintiff had in fact
committed the crime, the plaintiff "ha[d] no redress against his
attorney because [the plaintiffs] conduct was intentional and in
violation of the criminal law, whereas his attorney's was merely
negligent."20 5 Some commentators have followed a similar line,
sayingthat some serious misconduct cases can be explained"merely
as cases in which, as a matter of law, the plaintiffs fault exceeded
the defendant's."20 6
This kind of logic seems little more than a stealth version of
comparative fault, but with the court in control rather than the
jury. As such, it is objectionable because it selectively sidesteps the
established comparative fault mechanism in favor of an ad hoc and
morally subjective judge-based decision-making process.
defining the nature and scope of the defendant's duty of care owed to the plaintiff. DOBBS,
supra note 15, at 53940.
205. Howarthv. State, 925 P.2d 1330,1337 (Alaska 1996); cf. Shaw v. State, 861 P.2d 566,
568, 572 (Alaska 1993) (stating, in a case where plaintiff, whose convictions were set aside
as "constitutionally defective," sued his former attorney for legal malpractice, that if the
plaintiff did in fact commit the crime, then "[any subsequent negligent conduct by a
plaintiffs attorney is superseded by the greater culpability of the plaintiffs criminal
conduct"). In one case in which the court approved the serious misconduct bar in principle,
the court refused to apply it to the instant facts when "the defendant's culpability for the
damages [was] greater than the plaintiffs culpability." Poch v. Anderson, 580 N.W.2d 456,
458 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).
206. DOBBS, supra note 15, at 526 n.16.
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13. Enhance Criminal Laws
Some commentators have surmised that the serious misconduct
bar may have been motivated as a way to impose additional
sanctions on a person who violated the criminal laws in order to
enhance their punitive effects. °" The obvious rejoinder to this
rationale is that the courts should not be in the business of
imposing additional sanctions on conduct denominated as criminal
when the legislature has decided not to do so.
208
14. Criminal Malpractice: Avoiding Conflicting Resolutions
There are a number of rationales 9 that have been relied on to
support a variation of the serious misconduct bar in the context of
malpractice claims by accused persons against their former
criminal defense attorneys."O Some cases have expressed concern
that, unless actual innocence of the crime is a prerequisite to
recovery, a person convicted in a criminal proceeding might
thereafter prevail in a civil malpractice lawsuit against his criminal
defense attorney.2" The supposed need here is to avoid what may
be perceived as conflicting resolutions arising out of the criminal
prosecution.
The imperative of avoiding conflicting resolutions is more
apparent than real. Even a person who committed a crime may
have been seriously harmed by the negligence of his criminal
defense attorney.212 Thus, to that extent there is not necessarily a
conflict between a negative outcome to the criminal proceedings and
a subsequent positive outcome in the malpractice case.
207. 3 HARPERETAL., supra note 30, § 17.6, at 618 (stating that the doctrine's application
"could be justified at all only as a stringent means of imposing additional sanctions to enforce
a very important provision of the criminal law").
208. Id.
209. These are addressed in the present subsection and subsequent subsections. See infra
notes 210-27 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 77-100 and accompanying text.
211. E.g., Wiley v. County of San Diego, 966 P.2d 983, 990 (Cal. 1998) (stating, in the
context of legal malpractice claims, that requiring the plaintiff to prove actual innocence of
the charges is consistent with the judicial policy against the creation of conflicting
resolutions arising out of the same transaction).
212. See infra notes 221-23 and accompanying text.
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15. Criminal Malpractice: Availability of Defense Attorneys and
Costs
A common drumbeat to support a rule precluding malpractice
recovery against a criminal defense counsel in the absence of
proof of the plaintiffs factual innocence of the crime has been a
concern that otherwise we would have difficulty attracting
defense attorneys.21 Some courts have elaborated on this concern
by pointing to a special need to preserve "the pool of legal
representation available to criminal defendants, especially
indigents."214 There is a related concern that without the limitation
on liability in the form of the innocence requirement, attorneys who
do serve as defense counsel might practice "defensive" law,
generating additional expenditures of resources.215
This rationale is subject to numerous criticisms. It ignores the
fact that in one respect the innocence requirement, by eroding the
deterrent to malpractice, may undermine the right to effective
assistance of counsel. As one judge remarked, "the public not only
has an interest in encouraging the representation of criminal
defendants, but it also has an interest in making sure that the
representation is, at the very least, not negligent.2 6 Professor
Susan Koniak has observed that the need-to-attract-defense-
attorneys argument "boils down to nothing more than an admission
that we do not pay these lawyers enough to demand that they be
competent.2 17 It may be emblematic of the disjunction of rights and
213. Rowe v. Schreiber, 725 So.2d 1245, 1251-52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (stating, in the
context of legal malpractice claims, that a rule is needed to encourage representation of
criminally accused, especially those who are indigent, and that there is no need for more
deterrence for criminal defense counsel because they still would have to worry that an
accused might be innocent, in which case defense counsel might be subject to liability) (citing
Glennv. Aiken, 569 N.E.2d 783, 788 (Mass. 1991)); Labovitz v. Feinberg, 713 N.E.2d 379, 383
(Mass. App. Ct. 1999) (stating, in the context of legal malpractice claims, that a rule is
needed to encourage representation of accused persons, especially indigent persons, by
reducing risk of successful legal malpractice claims against criminal defense counsel) (citing
Glenn v. Aiken, 569 N.E.2d 783, 783 (Mass. 1991)).
214. Mahoneyv. Shaheen, Cappiello, Stein & Gordon, 727 A.2d 996,999 (N.H. 1999). The
court inMalhney noted that many of the attorneys who represent accused persons "do so on
a pro bono or reduced fee basis." Id. at 1000.
215. Wiley, 966 P.2d at 991.
216. Glenn v. Aiken, 569 N.E.2d 783, 790 (Mass. 1991) (Liacos, C.J., concurring).
217. Koniak, supra note 89, at 12.
2002] 1057
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
obligations, with the "rhetorical emphasis ... on the importance of
the right ... [but with the obligation] a byproduct, an after-
thought."21 Not only is the serious misconduct bar in the form of an
innocence requirement incompatible with the right to effective
assistance of counsel, there is no empirical evidence that threat of
malpractice claims has deterred public defenders or retained
counsel from defending accused persons.219 The innocence require-
ment may also create an artificial distinction between attorneys
practicing in the civil and criminal law areas.220
16. Criminal Malpractice: Availability of Postconviction Relief
Some courts supporting an innocence requirement have relied on
the availability of postconviction procedural relief with which to
address ineffective assistance of counsel.22' Their point is that the
accused already has substantial postconviction remedial options
available with which to correct mistakes attributable to the
ineffectiveness of counsel.
The fallacy in this argument is that it assumes that the
standards for postconviction relief would be coterminous with the
proof of the elements required for a malpractice claim. More
importantly, the fact that postconviction relief may be available
might not erase the harm that the victim may already have
irrevocably suffered. For example, someone may have been
incarcerated for years before achieving postconviction relief, and
perhaps the plaintiff could have, but for the negligence of his
attorney, completely avoided prison time. Or consider Peeler v.
Hughes & Luce.222 There the plaintiff alleged that the defendant
committed legal malpractice in failing to communicate to the
plaintiff-accused an offer of absolute transactional immunity.
218. Id. at 23-24.
219. Wiley, 966 P.2d at 993 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
220. Id. Justice Msk does, however, endorse a requirement that plaintiff must obtain
postconviction relief before pursuing a malpractice claim in order to screen out frivolous
claims. Id. at 993-94.
221. Berringerv. Steele, 758 A.2d 574, 592 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (notingin the context
of legal malpractice claims in criminal defense cases, that "appellate, postconviction, and
habeas corpus remedies are available to address ineffective assistance of counsel") (quoting
Steele v. Kehoe, 747 So.2d 931, 933 (Fla. 1999)).
222. 909 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. 1995).
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Thereafter, the plaintiff entered into a plea agreement admitting
guilt to one count. The court held that plaintiffs must demonstrate
that "they have been exonerated on direct appeal, through post-
conviction relief, or otherwise."223 Clearly the plaintiff had suffered
serious harm that could not be erased or redressed solely by the
exercise of postconviction procedural devices even if the court were
to overturn the plaintiffs conviction.
17. Criminal Malpractice: Criminals Passing the Time
Some cases supporting at least some form of special limitation on
malpractice claims have worried that all the "free" time on the
hands of jailed inmates might otherwise be deployed in lawsuits
against criminal defense lawyers.22 ' I guess, by this reasoning, an
independently wealthy person without the time commitments of a
regular job (and therefore lots of spare time) should also be
precluded from suing. If we are worried about excessive
litigiousness, then that should be addressed nationally (or even
globally) rather than by targeting a specific group. This is especially
true with respect to indigent persons, whose legal rights (like their
civil and economic rights) have been historically neglected in this
society.
18. Criminal Malpractice: Procedural Safeguards Sufficient
Some cases have reasoned that legal malpractice claims are less
necessary for criminal representation than for civil representation,
because defendants in criminal proceedings are already protected
by a panoply of additional constitutional and procedural safeguards
beyond those applicable to civil litigation."z
223. Id. at 497-98.
224. Berringer, 758 A.2d at 592-93, 597 (requiring "appellate, post conviction, or habeas
relief, dependent upon attorney error, as a predicate to recovery in a criminal malpractice
action, when the claim is based on an alleged deficiency for which appellate, post conviction,
or habeas relief would be available," and noting concern that prisoners might occupy their
free time litigating against former attorneys).
225. Mahoney v. Shaheen, Cappiello, Stein & Gordon, 727 A.2d 996, 999 (N.H. 1999)
(noting, in the context of legal malpractice claims by accused persons, that the criminal
justice system itself"affords individuals charged with crimes a panoply of protections against
abuses of the system and wrongful conviction, including safeguards against incompetent and
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There are obvious problems with this reasoning. The fact that
there are additional protections available to accused persons does
not mean those safeguards are infallible or even effective. The
reasoning is also circular. It says in effect that lawsuits based on
failure of the procedural safeguards should be prohibited because
these safeguards are sufficient. Nor does the presence of these
safeguards mean that the accused has not been harmed by his
attorney's negligence.
19. Criminal Malpractice: Closure and Proliferation of
Lawsuits
Finally, some courts have intimated that restrictions on
malpractice claims by criminally accused persons are appropriate
to help bring closure to litigation and avoid proliferation of
lawsuits. One judge commented that "[i]f the law did not impose a
substantial burden on convicted criminals seeking to sue their
attorneys for professional negligence, most criminal convictions
might simply be a prelude to a civil malpractice suit."226
Why is it appropriate, however, for this category of lawsuits to be
short-circuited and not other types of lawsuits? If such tort reforms
are justified, then they should not occur atomistically, but across
the board. Nor should the treatment of persons accused of crimes be
considered in isolation from the dynamic and polycentric socio-
economic setting from which the subject's conduct grew.
In summary, the preceding questionable rationales undergirding
the serious misconduct bar are not sufficient to prop up this kind of
ad hoc "public policy" limitation on tort liability. Justice James
Hopkins, in a law review article, has offered the following
cautionary prescription about public-policy-based rules: "To base a
decision on the ground of public policy ... brings into the case ... the
exercise of community control quite apart from statute, judicial
ineffective counsel"); Colbert v. Haydon, 690 N.Y.S.2d 246, 248 (App. Div. 1999) (relying in
support of the proof-of-innocence requirement in the context of a legal malpractice claim, on
the "extra constitutional and procedural safeguards inherent in criminal proceedings").
226. Peeler, 909 S.W.2d at 501 (Phillips, C.J., dissenting) (endorsing, in principle, a less
"absolutist" and less sweeping version of the bar than the majority opinion, and one that
would be inapplicable to the instant case).
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precedent or doctrine."227 "[If the elastic theory of public policy] is
ever to be used as a ground for judicial decision, then it must be
justified by recourse to an analysis of the reasons which are the
foundation for the policy."21 The putative rationales for the serious
misconduct bar fail to assuage Hopkins' admonition.
II. TIME TO DEFINITIVELY REPUDIATE THE DocTRmiNE
A. Subverting the Goals of Tort Law
Fundamentally, the serious misconduct bar frustrates several
important goals of tort liability.229 In providing a mechanism for
compensating victims of accidents, tort liability directly promotes
the goals of spreading the costs of accidents and of allocating those
costs initially to the activities and enterprises that played a
significant role in engendering them. By defeating liability, the
serious misconduct bar forecloses compensation,23 0 and in so doing,
inhibits what should be the paramount ends of tort law, namely the
loss-spreading and loss-allocation goals. 31
Proponents of the serious misconduct bar would no doubt counter
that without the doctrine, we otherwise would undermine the tort
goal of deterrence by rewarding misconduct with damages, and in
so doing, erode the deterrence victims would otherwise confront by
the prospect of suffering uncompensated harm. This deterrence
point is specious. It ignores the fact that creating a bar to liability
would, at the same time it forecloses the plaintiffs claim, diminish
the deterrence faced by defendants. Moreover, many defendants in
these cases are engaging in the types of activities or enterprises
227. James D. Hopkins, Public Policy and the Formation of a Rule of Law, 37 BROOK. L.
REV. 323, 323 (1971).
228. Id. at 336.
229. For background on the goals of tort law generally, see Joseph H. King, Jr., A Goals-
Oriented Approach to Strict Tort Liability for Abnormally Dangerous Activities, 48 BAYLOR
L. REV. 342 (1996).
230. 3 HARPER ET AL., supra note 30, § 17.6, at 617; Prentice, supra note 5, at 123.
231. For a recent thoughtful essay urging the primacy of considerations of distributive
justice in tort law, see Gregory C. Keating, Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort
Law ofAccidents, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 193,195 (2000) (contending that"[a] conception ofjustice
that places less weight on considerations of corrective justice and more on considerations of
distributive justice can help us to make sense of strict liability and to put negligence in its
proper place").
106120021
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
that are amenable to systematic risk evaluation and reduction. On
the other hand, the plaintiffs impacted by the serious misconduct
bar are individuals, often young232 or vulnerable"3 individuals, who
are unsophisticated evaluators of risk and cost-benefit consid-
erations. Moreover, plaintiffs engaging in serious misconduct
usually will have violated criminal prohibitions, which have their
own deterrent of sanctions that remain unimpaired. More
immediately, many activities deemed serious misconduct, by
their obvious dangerousness or invasiveness, carry an inherent
inhibition. And in any event, focusing solely on the "wrongfulness"
of the plaintiffs conduct elevates corrective justice concerns over
the distributive-justice function of tort law, when just the opposite
should be true. 4 In other words, the serious misconduct bar
depreciates what should be the primacy of the distributive role of
the tort system.
A fairness goal, as embodied in the proportional-liability rules of
comparative fault, may also be undermined by the serious
misconduct bar."' The nearly universal replacement of the complete
bar of the traditional contributory negligence defense with a
comparative fault regime was in part based on fairness concerns of
proportionality-that the relative blameworthiness of plaintiffs
conduct be fairly reflected in the amount of his tort recovery.
232. E.g., Oden v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., 621 So.2d 953 (Ala. 1993) (involving a fourteen-
year-old victim); Barker v. Kallash, 468 N.E.2d 39 (N.Y. 1984) (barring a claim by a fifteen-
year-old); Symone T. v. Lieber, 613 N.Y.S.2d 404,406 (App. Div. 1994) (approving application
of the bar to a claim by a twelve-year-old rape victim who underwent an illegal abortion if
it were established that she "willfully submitted to an abortion which she knew to be
illegal"); Lee v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 497 S.E.2d 328 (Va. 1998) (applying bar to a
thirteen-year-old plaintiff riding with a sixteen-year-old driver). A tentative draft of the
Restatement takes a more forgiving and flexible approach toward children in addressing the
question of when a violation of statute may constitute negligence per se. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES) § 15 (Tentative Draft
No. 1, 2001) (stating that a violation may be excused and thus not deemed negligent when
it is reasonable because, inter alia, of the actor's childhood).
233. E.g., Symone T., 613 N.Y.S.2d at 404. In Symone, the plaintiffwas a twelve-year-old
victim of rape who underwent an abortion during which she suffered an amniotic fluid
embolism causing neurological damage. Id. She sued for medical malpractice. It appeared
that her undergoing this abortion was illegal because of the number of weeks she had been
pregnant. Id. at 405.
234. For analysis of the distibutive and corrective justice -dimensions of tort law, see
generally Keating, supra note 231.
235. See Prentice, supra note 5, at 124, 128.
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Obviously, to the extent that the serious misconduct bar bypasses
a rule of comparative fault, it subverts the fairness goals
represented by comparative fault.
B. Instrumentally: Straying From the Elemental Framework
The serious misconduct bar, as a freestanding doctrine, lurks like
a rusting old tool in the crawl space beneath the core tort elements
and defenses. One is never quite sure what its standing is or when
its archaic blade will next appear to dispatch a tort claim. As
Professor Silver remarked in another context, "[a] rule, which ought
never to have been stated, will encyst itself in the fabric of
negligence law and undermine its structure."2" 6 In his modern
classic on human error, James Reason has written that "[iun any
given situation, a number of rules may compete for the right to
represent the current state of the world."23 He adds that "the
system is extremely 'parallel' in that many rules may be active
simultaneously."23 ' This parallelism exists in the case of the serious
misconduct doctrine, where it coexists with traditional tort
elements and defenses. A number of the regular tort concepts are
more suitable vehicles for addressing the plaintiffs contributory
fault. A universal requirement in tort law is that the defendant's
tortious conduct has been a proximate cause of the plaintiffs harm.
A second, and often overlapping requirement, is that the duty owed
by the defendant has encompassed the harms suffered by the
plaintiff. When the plaintiffs injury arose in part from his own
misconduct, that fact may be relevant in the overall proximate
cause and duty analysis, but it should be considered only as a part
of the normal calculus and risk analysis.
Some courts addressing the proximate cause (and duty) question
have occasionally accorded undue significance to the perceived
236. Theodore Silver, One Hundred Years ofHarmfulError: The Historical Jurisprudence
of Medical Malpractice, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1193, 1239. James Reason has discussed the
phenomenon of "encysting" in the general context of the causes of human errors. JAMES
REASON, HUMAN ERROR 93 (1990). He describes encysting: "Topics are lingered over and
small details ... attended to lovingly ... [while] [o]ther more important issues are
disregarded .... [Eincysting [is] mediated by... bounded rationality, a poor self-assessment
and a desire to escape from the evidence of one's own inadequacy." Id.
237. REASON, supra note 236, at 74.
238. Id.
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criminality and wrongfulness of the plaintiffs conduct and have
articulated the issue in terms of whether the plaintiffs fault should
be deemed the "sole proximate cause."" s That formulation is
confusing and runs the risk that the proximate cause element might
be distorted to serve as a surrogate for the serious misconduct bar,
but in the guise of the proximate cause element. Indeed, some
commentators have advocated that type of expansive role for the
proximate cause element.240 It is appropriate to consider the
plaintiffs conduct in the proximate cause analysis, but not in
isolation. The plaintiffs conduct should simply be a part of total
factual setting on which the court and trier of fact base their
proximate cause 241 and duty242 analyses.
Professor Robertson gets it right, opposing an approach that
would deem egregious conduct by a victim as a superseding cause
of the harm (and thereby preclude finding a defendant's negligence
a proximate cause) "[i]f the only thing that makes the victim's
injury unforeseeable was the egregiousness of the victim's fault."24
He discusses the Restatement's "firestarter" illustration, which
239. DOBBS, supra note 15, § 196, at 489; Hayden, supra note 16.
240. See Hayden, supra note 16, at 888-90. Hayden defends use of a proximate cause
analysis, focusing on plaintiffs conduct as a superseding cause, as a way of softening effects
of pure comparative fault. His thesis is that we need this admittedly legal fiction "to avoid
making the slightly faulty defendant pay the overwhelmingly faulty plaintiff a very large
sum of money." Id. at 921. He says that "[alt times ... a theoretically pure and even simple
system must have some messy and inconsistent safety valves to prevent it from becoming
obsessively pure and simple... land thus] sonle 'rough edges' tend to preserve, not undercut,
otherwise theoretically seamless legal systems such as pure comparative responsibility." Id.
at 919. I would respond to Hayden that what we need is to change the system to
accommodate hard cases.
241. Dove, supra note 174, at 525, 530 (arguing that proximate cause should not be
allowed to "trump" use of comparative fault to address plaintiffs negligence unless a person
of ordinary prudence in the shoes of the defendant would find the type of harm
unforeseeable); id. at 525; see also David W. Robertson, Love and Fury: Recent Radical
Revisions to the Law of Comparative Fault, 59 LA. L. REV. 175, 191 (1998).
242. The serious misconduct bar goes beyond the realm of a traditional duty analysis.
Professor MacDougall notes the question whether the serious misconduct doctrine"amounts
to a denial or negation by the court of a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff
or whether its application simply constitutes a refusal by the court to award damages for a
breach of that duty." MacDougall, supra note 5, at 3. He says that the serious misconduct
doctrine is probably more accurately characterized in the latter sense. Id. at 4.
243. Robertson, supra note 241, at 190 n.36; see also DOBBS, supra note 15, § 196, at 489
(suggesting that a sole proximate cause analysis focusing too singlemindedlyonthe plaintiffs
fault would, if widely applied, undermine the comparative fault system of fault allocation).
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posits a situation in which a defendant negligently spills gasoline
on the street and the plaintiff knowingly throws a lighted
match into the gasoline.244 The Restatement asserts that the
"unforeseeably egregious aspect"245 of the plaintiffs conduct is not
only relevant to the percentage fault of the plaintiff, but also to the
question of whether the plaintiffs conduct "was a superseding
cause [of the plaintiff's] injur[ies]. "24 The Restatement adds that
"[w]hether a plaintiffs conduct constitutes a superseding cause
is beyond the scope of this Restatement."247 Robertson rejects a
test that treats separately (rather than melds) "unforeseeable
egregiousness" and "unforeseeable for any other reason."24 Thus, he
offers the following solution for the Restatement illustration:
If B's conduct is such that an innocent bystander could not
recover fromA-if a fire started by conduct like B's was beyond
the scope of the foreseeable risks that made it negligent for A to
spill the gasoline-then refusing recovery to B would be a sound
application of "normal" legal cause reasoning .... But if an
innocent bystander could probably recover, then so must B,
although B's recovery should be drastically reduced; the
principles of comparative fault call for assigning B a very high
percentage, in order to reflect the egregiousness of his fault. 9
244. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 3, illus. 7 (2000).
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.; see also id. cmt. c. The reporters' notes accompanying the Restatement observe
with respect to proximate cause that (although beyond the scope of that Restatement):
[C] omparative negligence may have an effect on those [complete bar proximate
cause type] rules, especially when they are based on a judgment that the
egregious culpability of an intervening cause relieves an earlier, less culpable
actor from liability. This all-or-nothing approach is undermined by the premise
of comparative responsibility: that the factfinder should compare on a sliding
scale the responsibility of all actors who caused an injury. Rather than totally
absolve an earlier cause under a rule about superseding causes, the factfinder
could just adjust the percentages assigned to the parties.
Id. cmt. b, reporter's note.
248. Robertson, supra note 241, at 190 n.36.
249. Id. at 191 n.37; see also DOBBS, supra note 15, § 196 at 490 (suggesting that the sole
proximate cause and superseding cause rhetoric be dropped in this context, and reasoning
that "the important thing is not that the plaintiff is at fault, or that the plaintiffs fault was
a superseding cause, but rather that the harm was outside the scope of the [risk of the]
defendant's negligence"); Dove, supra note 174, at 502 n.48 (stating in connection with the
firestarter illustration that "if an innocent bystander could recover from the person who
spilled the gasoline, then the firestarter should be permitted to recover as well"). Dove
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The serious misconduct bar also addresses the same subject as
the comparative fault defense. This raises two concerns. First, the
serious misconduct bar appears redundant. More crucially, because
the serious misconduct doctrine operates 'as a complete bar
foreclosing any recovery, it is an atavistic doctrine that transcends
and subverts the compromise inherent in comparative fault
systems." It allows selective resurrection of a contributory
negligence defense under the cloak of the serious misconduct bar.
The persistence of the serious misconduct bar, despite the
widespread adoption of comparative fault, may reflect the doctrine's
long lineage. James Reason has observed, in connection with a
rule's strength, that:
The chances of a particular rule gaining victory in the "race" to
provide a description or a prediction for a given problem
situation depends critically upon its previous "form," or the
number of times it has achieved a successful outcome in the
past. The more victories it has to its credit, the stronger will be
the rule.2-1
The continuing comfort some courts exhibit with the serious
misconduct doctrine evinces the subtle staying power of the
complete bar mindset that characterized traditional contributory
reasons that his approach, also advocated by Robertson, places the proximate cause question
"more squarely in the hands of the jury" and avoids too broad an application ofthe proximate
cause analysis that would encourage "evasion and intellectual dishonesty." Id. at 526-27. He
further notes that otherwise barring the plaintiff might result in "a perverse reward for
endangering the incompetent." Id. at 530.
250. RESTATEMENT(THIED) OFTORTS: APPORTIONMENT OFLIABILITY § 8 cmt. c, reporter's
note (2000) (discussing the fact that an actor's conduct may have violated a statute, and
stating that "[ilt is highly unlikely that a legislature intended to affect the way a court
applies comparative responsibility" and that "the factfinder should consider circumstances
that would be relevant to a finding of negligence in the absence of a statute, even though
those circumstances would not be relevant to whether violation of the statute constitutes
negligence per se"); MacDougall, supra note 5, at 40-41 (describing the serious misconduct
bar as incompatible with comparative fault); Robertson, supra note 241, at 190 n.36 (noting
that "the core command of the pure percentage fault system is that the victim takes a very
high percentage assignment but is not barred").
251. REASON, supra note 236, at 77.
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negligence. 2 "To a person with just a hammer, every problem looks
like a nail." s
The appropriate doctrine for addressing the fault of a plaintiff
that has proximately contributed to his injury is the defense of
comparative fault to the extent it has been adopted in the
jurisdiction. 4 Accordingly, the conduct of the plaintiff should
seldom 5 justify the court deciding to bar the claimant as a matter
of law, especially in jurisdictions adhering to a pure form of
comparative fault. Whatever effect the plaintiff's wrongfulness has
on the outcome of the claim-including whether the claim will be
completely precluded or the damages proportionately reduced-
should depend on the relative fault of the plaintiff and the version
of comparative fault that is applicable. 6 The serious misconduct
bar reinvests the effect of the plaintiff's fault with a complete bar
potential despite a comparative fault scheme, and thus legitimizes
252. Reason elaborates that '[i]f a rule has been employed successfully in the past, then
there is an almost overwhelming tendency to apply it again, even though the circumstances
no longer warrant its use." Id. at 78.
253. Id.
254. Ofcourse, ifa state has retained the doctrines ofcontributory negligence and implied
assumption of risk, then those doctrines might apply. Even then, however, the contributory
negligence and assumption of risk defenses might not be coterminous with the serious
misconduct bar. For example, the issue of contributory negligence typically is decided by the
jury rather than the court when reasonable minds could differ on the question, and
contributory negligence traditionally has been subjected to an important catalogue of
ameliorating doctrines. DOBBS, supra note 15, at 498-502.
255. A court could still dismiss a claim where reasonable minds could not differ that the
plaintiffwas (in a pure comparative negligence regime) one hundred percent responsible, or
whose fault (under a modified comparative fault rule) exceeded the threshold that would
allow any relief. Dove, supra note 174, at 528. Notwithstanding the fact, however, that
comparative fault might not completely foreclose decisions by the court for the defendant as
a matter of law based upon the wrongfulness of the plaintiffs conduct, that approach is still
preferable to a serious misconduct option because at least with respect to the former, "it
would ... maintain the conceptual integrity of the law of negligence." Id. at 528 n.187
(arguing againstinappropriate application of a superseding cause analysis for addressing the
matter of the plaintiffs fault).
256. RESTATEMNT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 7 cmt. d (2000)
(advocating comparative fault"even though a party's conductviolated a statute ... unless the
purpose of the statute ... is to place the entire responsibility for such harm on the party");
id. § 8 cmt. c, reporter's note (2000) (stating with respect to the violation of statute rules that
'[ilt is highly unlikely that a legislature intended to affect the way a court applies
comparative responsibility. Thus, the factfinder should consider circumstances that would
be relevant to a finding of negligence in the absence of statute, even though those
circumstances would not be relevant to whether violation of the statute constitutes
negligence per se.").
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an avenue for the court to end-run the jury.257 Moreover, the trip-
wire mechanism of the serious misconduct bar, with its spotlight on
the perceived criminality and immorality of the plaintiffs conduct,
employs a narrower focus than that contemplated by comparative
fault.25
8
In the context of legal malpractice claims against criminal
defense attorneys, the role of two of the traditional tort elements
deserves some emphasis. The core elements requiring proof of a
violation of the standard of care and causation clearly apply. Thus,
an accused suing his attorney for malpractice must prove "that the
lawyer failed to act properly and that, but for that failure, the
result would have been different, for example because a double-
jeopardy defense would have prevented conviction."259 In particular,
the causation requirement26 constitutes a very substantial hurdle
to be overcome in such claims. 1 In short, the innocence
requirement is judicial "overkill""2 as a way of addressing the
concern over frivolous lawsuits by criminally accused persons.
James Reason maintains that "[cihange in one guise or another
is a regular feature of error-producing situations."6 3 The serious
misconduct bar stands as an example of erroneous reasoning
based on a failure to appreciate the realities of change. Not only do
patterns of criminal behavior broadly fluctuate, but so do society's
sentiments of the nature of wrongfulness. The serious misconduct
bar is a facile nostrum that does not thoughtfully deal with the
matter of crime in this society. Francis Fukuyama, in his most
257. Professor MacDougall admonishes that the serious misconduct bar may operate as
a "convenient way to achieve a result that the more structured and more stringent
requirements" of the defenses of contributory and now usually comparative fault may not
allow. MacDougall, supra note 5, at 38.
258. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 8 & cmt. c (2000)
(noting that the plaintiffs awareness of the risks of his conduct is relevant to the
comparative fault analysis, and that "jilt is not possible to articulate an algorithm by which
a factfinder can determine percentages of responsibility").
259. RESTATEMENT (THIRD): THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 53 cmt. d (2001).
260. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
261. DOBBS, supra note 15, at 1391 (referring to the heavy demands the causation
requirement creates on the plaintiff in malpractice claims); Kessler, supra note 87, at 406-07
(stating that the causation element "poses the greatest barrier for those who have received
inadequate professional services"). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD): THELAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 53 (2001) (discussing the causation requirement in legal malpractice cases).
262. Koniak, supra note 89, at 12.
263. REASON, supra note 236, at 60.
1068 [Vol. 43:1011
THE SERIOUS MISCONDUCT BAR
recent book,26' discusses the various manifestations of deteriorating
social conditions, one of which he identifies as the increase in
crime 5.2 " Fukuyama posits that changes in societal levels of crime
(or serious misconduct) derive from a complex dynamic26 6 and are
cyclical, 6 7 or at least not permanent. He says that the "social order,
once disrupted, tends to get remade,"268 and that i]n the social and
moral sphere ... history appears to be cyclical, with social order
ebbing and flowing over the space of multiple generations."269
Fukuyama notes that "[t]he essence of the shift in values that is
at the center of the Great Disruption is, then, the rise of moral
individualism and consequent miniaturization of community."' 0
Given the sense of a loss of social control that comes with the
manifestations of increased individualism and miniaturization of
community, there is a temptation to "do something," or "to send a
message." The serious misconduct bar is an example of this kind of
reflexive response to the perception of a loss of control.
Garrett Hardin, in his now famous essay, has described the
relativity of morals, explaining that "morality of an act is a function
of the state of the system at the time it is performed."271 He
elaborates, saying: "[Tihe morality of a act [sic] cannot be
determined from a photograph. One does not know whether a man
killing an elephant or setting fire to the grassland is harming
others until one knows the total system in which his act appears." 72
The complex etiology and cyclicality of waves of crime suggest the
futility of isolated responses such as the ad hoc and selective
applications of the serious misconduct bar. Moreover, such
expedients mask the underlying dynamics of the phenomenon of
crime.
264. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE GREAT DISRUPTION (2000).
265. Id. at 4-5.
266. Fukuyama identifies a number of contributing factors. He says increases in crime
may be the product of the stresses from transition from an industrial to an information era.
Id. at 5. He also notes that intensive individualism and innovation have "spilled over into the
realm of social norms, where it corroded virtually all forms of authority and weakened the
bonds holding families, neighborhoods, and nations together." Id. at 5-6.
267. See id. at 6.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 282.
270. Id. at 91.
271. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1245 (1968).
272. Id. at 1245.
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C. Structurally: Absence of Standards
The serious misconduct bar is also objectionable on structural
grounds. The doctrine lacks clear standards,"' a common feature of
doctrines that have never been convincingly justified by sensible
comprehensible rationales nor thoughtfully integrated into a
workable analytical framework.
Ronald Dworkin has articulated a distinction between principles
and rules,274 which he says differ operationally "in the character of
the direction they give."275 He would classify the notion that "no
man may profit by his own wrong" as a principle rather than a
rule.276 Whereas "[r]ules are applicable in an all-or-nothing
fashion,"2" a principle "does not even purport to set out conditions
that make its application necessary.... [Rather, it] states a reason
that argues in one direction, but does not necessitate a particular
decision."27
And therein lies part of the problem. The serious misconduct
doctrine is not a workable rule at all, but more of a repackaged
reflection of the shall-not-profit principle that supposedly animates
it. The dissent in the seminal Barker case complained that "[iun
the past when we have foreclosed relief on public policy grounds,
we have done so under circumstances in which objectively
determinable facts made application of the rule certain and
consistent."279 But not here.
Virtually no courts have suggested that the serious misconduct
bar should automatically preclude recovery by every victim whose
injury arises out of criminal conduct. We are left then with deciding
what conduct will be deemed "serious" enough to rub a judge the
wrong way to cause him to dust off and apply the serious
273. MacDougall, supra note5, at21 (commenting thatthere is"no acceptable orworkable
method for deciding" when the doctrine should apply); Prentice, supra note 5, at 101-03
(criticizing the doctrine because the legislative intent to bar a civil remedy is not known, and
the cases are decided on "ad hoc, subjective basis").
274. Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CRH. L. REV. 14,25 (1967).
275. Id.
276. Id. at 23.
277. Id. at 25.
278. Id. at 26.
279. Barker v. Kallash, 468 N.E.2d 39, 49 (N.Y. 1984) (Simons, J., dissenting).
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misconduct bar." ° How confident are we of the predictability and
fairness of the standards for a rule that deems it serious
misconduct for a twelve-year-old rape victim to undergo an abortion
that was illegal because of the number of weeks of gestation?21 Or,
consider the trilogy of the three pipe-bomb cases. A New York case
held that the conduct of a fifteen-year-old injured while allegedly
constructing a three to four inch pipe bomb in his backyard a few
days before the Fourth of July constituted serious misconduct.282
But, an Oregon court refused to approve the doctrine in a case
where a fifteen-year-old plaintiff was injured by the premature
explosion of a pipe bomb he was allegedly making.23 And in another
case, one from Massachusetts involving a fourteen-year-old alleged
firecracker-pipe-bomb builder, the court refused to say whether it
would even approve the bar in principle. 4 It held that the bar
would not apply here because its application would "offend a
countervailing public policy to the extent it could also protect from
possible liability those persons from whom the firecrackers were
obtained."285 What do we have with children who experiment with
fireworks-future Timothy McVeighs or the "Rocket Boys"286 of
October Sky" 7 fame?
280. The Barker majority downplays the difficulties in drawing lines, saying simply that
cases will essentially have to be dealt with one at a time as they present themselves. Id. at
44 (citing Corbett v. Scott, 152 N.E. 467, 469 (N.Y. 1926)).
281. SymoneT. v. Lieber, 613 N.Y.S.2d404 (App. Div. 1994). Symone T. maybe contrasted
with the outcome in another New York case several years later involving an allegedly
negligently performed vasectomy. Hernandez v. Yoon, 661 N.Y.S.2d 753 (Sup. Ct. 1997). The
plaintiff-patient, who was married when he underwent a vasectomy, alleged that
notwithstanding the vasectomy, he impregnated his girlfriend. Id. at 754. The plaintiff
sought damages for psychological injury claiming that not only did he impregnate his
girlfriend, but that she subsequently had to undergo an abortion. Id. The court recognized
the applicability of the serious misconduct bar in principle, but refused to apply it on the
merits in the instant case because it believed that adultery did not rise to the level of a
aserious crime." Id.
282. Barker, 468 N.E.2d at 39.
283. Ashmore v. Cleanweld Prods., Inc., 672 P.2d 1230, 1231 (Or. Ct. App. 1983).
284. Flanagan v. Baker, 621 N.E.2d 1190, 1193 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993).
285. Id.
286. HOMER H. HICKAM, JR., ROCKT BOYS: AMEMOIR (1998).
287. OCTOBERSKY (Universal 1999). The acclaimed film was based on the book by Homer
Hickam. HICAmi, supra note 286. For those who did not read the book or see the film, they
were based on the experiences of a former NASA engineer while a Coalwood, West Virginia
high school senior who, with some pals, were prompted in 1957 by Sputnik to make and
launch their own small rockets. The Coalwood Way, PUBLISHERS WEEKLY, Sept. 18,2000, at
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Doctrines like the serious misconduct bar are dangerous because
they offer deceptive comfort to judges that they are reaching the
"right" decision. As the late Charles Black observed (while
addressing the arbitrariness of death penalty decisions):
"Mistake" and "arbitrariness"... are reciprocally related. As a
purported "test" becomes less and less intelligible, and hence
more and more a cloak for arbitrariness, "mistake" becomes less
and less possible-not, let it be strongly emphasized, because of
any certainty of one's being right, but for the exactly contrary
reason that there is no "right" or "wrong" discernible."5
Without lucid and predictable guidance on what constitutes "serious
misconduct," the doctrine creates a sort of roving commission for
judges to use to keep the heat on perceived criminals, and to keep
the heat off of themselves for creating the appearance of coddling
miscreants.
D. Operationally: Ad Hoc and Selective
In addition to the costs inherent in any doctrine lacking
meaningful standards, 9 the doctrine is subject to selective 290 and
arbitrary application, further undermining its standing, and the
integrity of the torts system. It may also invite judges to vent their
moral sensibilities or react to anticipated public indignation based
101 (reviewing HOMER HICKAM, THE COALWOOD WAY (2000)); Dave McNary, Tyros,
Hyphenates Top WGA Nominations List, VARIETY, Feb. 14,2000, at 21.
It is not unusual for the Hickam book to be assigned reading in secondary schools. For
example, the science of rocketry was the focus of a recent summer institute for a group of
ninth graders planning to enter Mount Pleasant High School teacher academy magnet
program in Rhode Island. Reginal Duell, A Better Trajectory-Rocket Program Eases
Students' Way into High School, PROVIDENCE J., July 17, 2000. The Hickam book was
required reading. The goals of the program were to develop students' skill in science, math,
critical thinking and literacy, and to reduce the high school dropout rate. Id.
288. CHARLEs L. BLACK, JR., CAPITAL PUNIHMENT: THE INEVITABLMY OF CAPRICE AND
MISTAKE 28 (2d ed. 1981).
289. Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE
L.J. 1, 18-22 (1992).
290. Barkerv. Kallash, 468 N.E.2d 39,47 (N.Y. 1984) (Simons, J., dissenting) (stating that
"[a] plaintiffs right to maintain an action... should not rest on a Judge's subjective view of
whether the conduct is serious or egregious: Judges will differ in making such an
evaluation").
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on the moral flavor of the month. Professor MacDougall opines that
the prerequisites for the doctrine are so malleable they are merely
convenient tools applied "to fact situations that the courts find
morally troubling. The result is that on similar fact patterns,
involving different personalities, courts have differed on the
applicability of the doctrine."291 The moral overlay of the doctrine
makes its indefiniteness and selectivity especially dangerous.
MacDougall warns that "application of public policy by the judges
to deny recovery ... is simply ... [a] moralistic decision ... to treat
certain individuals as not fit for the court to entertain."292 Professor
Oscar Gray refers to the doctrine as a "barbarous relic of the worst
there was in puritanism."
293
Some commentators have focused on the danger of selective
application of the serious misconduct bar in particular contexts. The
application of the doctrine is especially worrisome in the abortion
setting.29 ' These cases typically have involved malpractice claims by
a patient undergoing what was, at least at the time, an illegal
abortion. Consider the Symone T.295 case. The patient was a twelve-
year-old victim of rape who apparently underwent an abortion too
late in her pregnancy for it to be legal.2 9 ' During the medical
procedure, she suffered an amniotic fluid embolism resulting in
neurological injury. The court held that if it were determined that
the child had undergone the abortion willingly, she would be barred
from suing the abortionist for malpractice because, as we all know,
"one may not profit from one's own wrongdoing."2 9 This is not new.
An early law review article supporting such application of the bar
in illegal abortion cases, expressed a concern that otherwise "a right
of action would be used as a means of blackmail by the more
291. MacDougall, supra note 5, at 37; see also id. at 33-34 (noting that the courts'
"emphasis on public policy is a convenient way for a court to avoid the substance of the rule
and ... [to avoid enunciating] some clear and justifiable basis for the existence and
application of the doctrine").
292. Id. at 33.
293. 3 HARPERETAL., supra note 30, § 17.6, at 617-18.
294. Hollister, supra note 147, at 389, 390 & n.20, 447.
295. Symone T. v. Lieber, 613 N.Y.S.2d 404 (App. Div. 1994).
296. Id
297. Id. at 405.
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discreditable class of patient upon whom such operations are most
frequent."
298
Where is the "profit" here? Is it really necessary to deter preteen
Symone? Are not the prospects of this kind of medical intervention
for this child terrifying enough, especially with the added threat of
criminal sanctions? And what of the need to deter potentially
negligent abortionists? Application of the barin these cases reflects,
according to Gail Hollister, "the judicial system's bias against
women, especially those whose claims arise in a uniquely female
context."
299
There also is a danger of other psychological dynamics at play in
the serious misconduct cases. Do judges fear contamination from a
stigma30 0 from the wrongdoers? Alex Geisinger describes "courtesy
stigma "  as the perception that "[ii ndividuals normally considered
without stigma can, by association with the degraded, acquire some
of the socially degrading characteristics of a marked person."30 2 He
adds that "the relationship need not be of an enduring nature for
courtesy stigma to occur."
303
Some writers have suggested that the mental process of
categorization, viewed broadly, may not represent so much a
pernicious human character flaw, but rather a basic human mental
coping mechanism. According to modern social psychological theory:
298. Bohlen, supra note 31, at 832-33 (articulating the serious misconduct doctrine in
terms of a consent defense to bar a victim of negligent abortion); cf. Peter Westen, The
Meaning of Equality in Law, Science, Math, and Morals: A Reply, 81 MICH. L. REV. 604,622
n.32 (1983) (stating that in 1779, Thomas Jefferson tried unsuccessfully to have the Virginia
legislature revive the institution of outlawry that would have declared that anywhite woman
who failed to leave the state within the year of having a child by an African-American to be
outside the protection of the law). For a useful insight by a nonlawyer into the judicial
ambivalence over whether women undergoing illegal abortions were accomplices or victims
in criminal and civil abortion cases, see generally Reagan, supra note 53.
299. Hollister, supra note 147, at 452.
300. Alex Geisinger has defined stigma as "a label marking someone (or something) as
deviant." Alex Geisinger, Nothing but Fear Itself- A Social-Psychological Model of Stigma
Harm and Its Logical Implications, 76 NEB. L. REV. 452,476 (1997). He says that "stigma is
the result of a cognitive 'marking' process, completely independent of the potential for future
actual harm." Id. at 454.
301. Id. at 477.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 478.
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Every person, and perhaps even every object that we encounter
in the world, is unique, but to treat each as such would be
disastrous.... To function at all, we must design strategies for
simplifying the perceptual environment and acting on less-than-
perfect information. A major way we accomplish both goals is by
creating categories. °
The problem with categorization lies in our failure to appreciate
its cognitive dynamic, and its simplistic superficiality and in-
completeness. Linda Krieger observes that "[clognitive psychologists
have told us more about the shortcomings of human social inference
cognition than about how the various biases they identify can be
reduced or controlled.30 5 In some respects, the serious misconduct
bar 0 6 may be driven by a tendency toward stereotypical
categorization-of pregnant women, of persons accused of crimes,
of impetuous youths experimenting with fireworks, cars, or
elevators. Once we appreciate the human tendency to view the
external world categorically, the importance of resisting facile
categorically inspired rules becomes evident.
Neal Feigenson has pointed out that "sympathy is more readily
aroused the greater the similarity between observer and
sufferer. 3 0 Feigenson warns that "[tihese effects may lead to less
just decisions." 8' Not only might the judge perceive the dissonance
in his background and that of the serious wrongdoer, but he may
sometimes sense a similarity with the defendant. In the context of
malpractice claims against their criminal defense attorneys, one
article observed that "[n]o judge who, in his day, defended clients
accused of crime, can help identifying with the lawyer in the dock
304. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach
to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1188 (1995).
305. Id. at 1245.
306. See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or
Adaption?, 79 OR. L. REV. 61,81-83 (2000) (discussing the cognitive phenomenon known as
"representativeness heuristic," which refers to "the reliance on the degree of apparent
similarity between the features of the events to the features of the category in judging
whether an event is a member of a particular category," and noting that it can potentially
influence the way judgments are made in the courts).
307. Neal R. Feigenson, Sympathy and Legal Judgment: A Psychological Analysis, 65
TENN.L. REv. 1, 53 (1997). Feigenson describes sympathy as involving "the ability to imagine
oneself in the sufferer's predicament and, in some sense, to feel the other's pain." Id. at 7.
308. Id. at 54.
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whose professional decisions a lay jury is being asked to
question."30 9 Feigenson concludes that "no acceptable legal or moral
theory makes the similarity of the decision-maker to the litigant or
the likability of the litigant relevant to the substantive justice of the
outcome."" l°
CONCLUSION
The serious misconduct bar has proven a slippery and vexing
doctrine. Although for years the doctrine seemed submergedin the
broader contributory negligence rule, more recently it has surfaced
as a freestanding construct. Neither the courts nor commentators
have identified a thoughtful rationale for the doctrine. I have
attempted to show that the putative justifications commonly
associated with the doctrine are neither sound nor convincing. More
centrally, I think the serious misconduct bar is objectionable on
more fundamental grounds. First, the doctrine frustrates thepolicy
goals of tort law. Second, it is instrumentally flawed because it
moves decision makers out of the established elemental tort law
framework into an ad hoc and potentially selective process. Third,
the serious misconduct bar suffers structurally from the absence of
lucid, predictable, or workable standards guiding its application.
And, finally, the doctrine is operationally dangerous because it
requires the court to evaluate the plaintiff's conduct through a
moral prism trained on an ever changing social landscape and
climate, and therefore can be applied selectively and arbitrarily.
In their consummate work on decision making, Irving Janis and
Leon Mann have observed that "[u]ntil a person is challenged by
some disturbing information or event that calls his attention to a
real loss soon to be expected, he will retain an attitude of
complacency about whatever course of action (or inaction) he has
309. Otto M. Kaus & Ronald E. Mallen, The Misguiding Hand of Counsel-Reflections on
"Criminal Malpractice," 21 UCLA L. REV. 1191, 1206-07 (1974). Otto Kaus, one of the co-
authors, was a judge in the California Court of Appeals.
310. Feigenson, supra note 307, at 54.
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been pursuing.""1' I hope this Article will serve to focus the courts'
attention on the need to repudiate the serious misconduct bar.
311. IRVING L. JANIS & LEON MANN, DECISION MAKING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF
CONFLICT, CHOICE, AND COMMITMENT 172 (1977).
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